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INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND SOVIET STRATEGY

By Jack Kemp

In a world whose dimensions have been shrunk by instant communications, by satellites which can report with high accuracy the location and identity of every vessel on the oceans' surfaces, and by the new phenomenon of a Soviet white water navy operating anywhere it wants anytime it wants, every major waterway becomes a component which relates to every other. If you know what is going on at every one of them at the same time, you know how to effect what will go on at every one of them at a future point in time. And the Soviets have the increased capability of doing just that.

There are not that many of these major passages. Only about 2 dozen of truly major commercial importance for international trade, and about half of these are crucial for the deployment of naval vessels. They are, as one would expect by logic, spread out over the globe's surface, from Gibraltar, Suez, to the Strait of Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope, the Strait of Magellan, the Strait of Hormuz, to the Panama Canal.

In 1955, the Soviets had control of none of these waterways and effective influence over almost none. It has not been that way since. Today the Soviet drives to control or win influence over the vital waterways of the world. It has, in one way or another, reached every single waterway.

Let us look at them one by one.

The Strait of Gibraltar

This is probably the most familiar strait to Americans. It is, of course, between the southernmost tip of the Iberian peninsula — the peninsula on which we find Portugal and Spain — and the northernmost tip of western Africa, specifically at Morocco. It figures in our history back to the days of the Phoenicians and Greeks, when the strait was called the Pillars of Hercules, and the days of the Roman Empire. Until the opening of the Suez Canal at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea at the beginning

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of this century, it was the only entrance into and exit out of the Mediterranean. I do not think I have to recite its importance during the Second World War and the fight for North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.

Its importance has not diminished since then. Whether it is a war in the Mideast, or a crisis on Cyprus, or the trade route for oil from the Arab producing countries, or in relation to NATO and our 6th Fleet or the Soviet's massive buildup of naval vessels in the Mediterranean, it must be seen as a vital waterway.

The Soviets understand the importance of this waterway to us and to them. It is not a secure strait today – for us.

Two years ago the Communists came to power in Portugal. They failed to consolidate their gains early enough to keep from sliding back out of power, but they are still a heavy influence in the governing socialist coalition. What happens to be one of the largest ports in Europe – and not by coincidence one of the closest to the Strait of Gibraltar? Portugal's capital city, the port of Lisbon.

After one passes through the Strait heading west to east into the Mediterranean, a ship has Moscow and Cuba-oriented Algeria on the southern littoral then equally Communist-oriented Libya also to the south, both lying on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa.

You then approach Egypt and the northwestern entrance to the Suez Canal and then the Red Sea, the route to the oil-producing States of the Persian Gulf, thence the Indian Ocean, thence the Pacific. It is appropriate to discuss the Suez Canal and the Red Sea at this point.

The Suez Canal and the Red Sea

The Suez Canal is, of course, the northwestern entrance to the Red Sea. If the canal is closed, there simply is no means of seaborne transit to western Europe and the United States from the oil-producing countries, except to go all the way down the east coast of the African Continent, around the Cape of Good Hope, and then all the way around the west coast of the continent to get to western Europe or across the South Atlantic to get to the United States. When the canal is closed, as it was for 8 years following the 1967 Mideast war, thousands of miles – and billions in cost – are added to oil transportation, and thousands of miles – and days of valuable time – are added to naval movements.

The Suez Canal was originally controlled by a joint British-French-

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Egyptian company. But the canal was nationalized in 1956 by Egyptian President, Col. G. A. Nasser. Nasser moved increasingly into the Soviet orbit, and the direct Soviet military influence along the canal was felt.

Although Egypt under President Anwar Sadat has moved out from under the Soviet orbit, the Mideast remains one of the most volatile hotspots in the world. It is a place where peace simply is not assured and where major outbreaks of hostility always seem to be on the horizon. It is disturbing to me, too, that the Egyptian Government has again begun discussions on various types of assistance from the Soviet Union, engaging in a formal series of meetings earlier this year.

But the Suez Canal is not solely an Egyptian question. Even if the canal itself is open, access to it from the Indian Ocean cannot be guaranteed if the southern entrance to the canal — the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden — is closed. And that is becoming an increasing possibility, if the port of Djibouti in the former French Federation of Afars and Issas should fall in Communist hands, either from Ethiopia or Somalia, both of which have territorial claims over the recently independent colony.

As you travel southeast from the canal, you go south through the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is to the east, Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. To the west, after you leave the Egyptian coast on the Red Sea is Sudan, with its unstable history of pro- and anti-Communist military coups, and then the pro-Soviet government of Ethiopia, which is presently engaged in a Soviet-supplied-border war against the Somalians. The Red Sea narrows severely at its southeastern exit into the Gulf of Aden, and it is here that you have on one side, Djibouti, the principal rail center for access to the sea for Ethiopia.

And, on the other side, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, formerly the British colony of Aden, now clearly aligned with the Soviet Union. Please note that this means you have Soviet-supplied Somalia to the south and the PDR of Yemen to the north as you go from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Aden.

The Soviets have had for several years a naval missile handling facility at the Somalian coastal town of Berbera, the former capital of British Somaliland, located on the Gulf of Aden, only about 250 miles from the strait joining the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This facility is still there and still serving these purposes for the Soviets.

There are two routes out of the Indian Ocean. One is to the South Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope at the southernmost tip of the

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African Continent, the route which had to be used when the Suez Canal was closed. The other is across the Indian Ocean and to the South China Sea, via the Strait of Malacca, and thence to the Pacific. Let me discuss each of these.

The Cape of Good Hope

This cape's importance is obvious. It is not only the means of going between the South Atlantic, thus to Europe and North and South America, and the Indian Ocean, thus to the Persian Gulf States, South Asia, and the Far East, but it is in that context the principal alternative to the Suez Canal.

The cape's future lies with the future of South Africa. It is the southern tip of South Africa. Thus, its future is embroiled with the tension associated with the future of the area, a future already shaping its use, for to get from the Persian Gulf to the cape, the quickest route along the east coast of Africa is down through the Mozambique Channel, the waterway lying between Mozambique and the Malagasy Republic – formerly Madagascar.

We know from press reports, because it has been openly acknowledged, that Mozambique is receiving massive aid from the Soviet Union. Its president has hosted the Soviet leadership and has been hosted by them; he has welcomed Fidel Castro; and, he has served willingly as the main point of entry for arms and munitions against Rhodesia, which is landlocked west of Mozambique. But let me return to the question of the Cape of Good Hope.

There are four major ports in South Africa for commercial traffic – Durban, East London, and Port Elizabeth on the Indian Ocean side, and Cape Town on the Atlantic side. You also have the naval port of Simonstown, lying right at the cape. Their future will be decided by the future of the country.

Few things could better summarize the importance of the cape and what is going on there now – with respect to Soviet and United States naval forces and with respect to maritime commerce – than several paragraphs from the report to me of my administrative assistant upon his return from Simonstown last December. I quote:

> 1. Before the reopening of the Suez Canal, 70 ships per day went around the Cape, headed to or from North and South America and Western Europe, and principally, the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. That figure has *not* declined significantly, because many of these vessels are too large for the Suez Canal. All supertankers go around the Cape. Seventy-percent of the oil to western Europe, from the Persian Gulf,

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goes around the Cape today. To the supertanker, the Suez Canal is irrelevant.

3. Simonstown is the most sophisticated naval base on the African continent. It has full machinery and technological capabilities for modern weaponry . . . Simonstown is being dramatically enlarged and modernized too.

6. The "increase in Soviet activity has been phenomenal in recent years" – enormous amounts of war material on their cargo ships.

Two things of interest:

First, before the Angolan war, the Soviets were very discreet. Their military hardware was below deck, and one had to find it through intelligence sources. (The first arrival of major arms equipment from the Soviet Union to the Angolan port of Luanda was March 25, 1975.) After the Angolan war was over, they stopped making pretences. They now carry missile launchers, heavy armor, and even aircraft on top of the decks.

Second, in response to my question as to how many U.S. naval vessels are operating along the sea lanes at any given point in time, either on the Atlantic side or the Indian Ocean side, I was informed, "Zero." Not one. Only an occasional submarine. Yet, in contrast, the Soviets often have 30 naval vessels operating along this route.

It goes without saying that the use of port facilities along the South African coast would greatly enhance the at-sea capability which the Soviets are deploying and demonstrating. This could be accomplished in the next decade, if the United States is unmindful of the strategic consequences of the future of the area.

The Strait of Malacca

As I indicated a moment ago, the Strait of Malacca is the principal passage from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, via the South China Sea. The strait lies between the southernmost tip of the Asian mainland – at Malaysia and Singapore – and the Indonesian island of Sumatra.

This strait's future has been dramatically effected by the outcome of the war in Indochina. The strait lies about 700 miles south of Vietnam and Cambodia. If traffic through it were ever interdicted, ships would have to go hundreds of miles further, out of the way, and at great expense of time and dollars.

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The future of the South China Sea, into which the strait runs at its eastern end, could be heavily influenced, as would the strait, by what happens to the naval port facility at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Prior to the U.S. buildup in South Vietnam, Cam Ranh Bay was of no real military importance. It is only conceivable importance lay in what could be done with it. And, we did it. Cam Ranh Bay was turned into the second largest man-made naval port in the world, second only to the one the Allies constructed at Normandy for the invasion in 1944. We withdrew, and the Communists won.

What is the future of Cam Ranh Bay? The Soviets are now negotiating with the Vietnamese for full use of that Bay – and those facilities – because the Soviets have no warm water port in the Pacific. If they obtain them, they could dominate the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca and access to the trade routes to Japan and the United States could be easily and quickly intercepted.

The Strait of Magellan

Lying at the the southern tip of South America, this strait is owned outright by Chile. As a matter of fact, the strait actually goes through an island chain at the country's southernmost point.

Which was the first country in South America to "go Communist?" It was, of course, Chile, under Salvador Allende. Allende's outright support of guerrilla movements in Latin America and his ties to Moscow and Havana told the world where he stood. So did his internal policies. He was overthrown by tactics repugnant to most Americans, but it kept Communist control away from the strait, and in this particular context, worked significantly to our advantage.

The Panama Canal

Thirteen major trade routes of the world go through the Panama Canal. Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, all but the largest naval vessels and crude oil carriers use it easily. The reason we have had such a dramatic decrease in U.S. naval vessels using the canal has to relate to directions from Washington associated with the negotiations, and no one can convince me to the contrary. The percentage decline was too dramatic for it to have related to any other factor, especially the size of vessels.

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Shadowed first by Soviet submarine capabilities operating from Castro's Cuba on the Caribbean side of the canal, then by Allende's Chile on the Pacific side, the future of the canal now rests with the decisions made by the United States and the government of General Omar Torrijos.

Where does Torrijos stand on this matter of the Soviet Union and the United States? There is an answer which takes this out of speculation. The answer is what he is now doing with respect to his relations with the Soviet Union. On July 19, his government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union setting forth five areas for future bilateral talks. Those talks will cover Soviet purchases of Panamanian sugar at per ton prices higher than Panama can sell them anywhere else, construction by the Soviets of a hydroelectric plant, Soviet use of the free trade zone at the Panamanian city of Colon, and establishment of a major Soviet bank in Panama to facilitate Soviet trade in all of Latin America.

This agreement did not happen overnight. Torrijos has made it clear that he sees Castro's Cuba as the trend setter in the Caribbean, and the relationship between the two has amounted to more than handshakes.

I think the new agreement with the Soviet Union and the increasingly friendly association between Torrijos and Castro may explain the context in which the Panamanians are offering the terms of the new treaties. Their context, not the one which has been explained to us by American negotiators and proponents, is quite obviously how they view the treaties' terms and how they intend to rely upon and enforce them. When one considers the United States's intended future use of the canal and its critical importance to our national security — and it must be of such importance because our national administration is putting its heaviest emphasis on how it interprets the treaties' terms in a framework of security interests, nothing could be more important than understanding how the Panamanians intend to interpret those terms.

You cannot expect any informed American citizen, to look at what is going on in terms of the world's strategic waterways, then look at what the substantial and substantive differences of opinion are between the United States and Panama over the treaties now before us, and expect them to be supported.

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THE GENOCIDE TREATY

By Jeffrey B. Gayner

After twenty-six years of sporatic deliberation the United States Senate may vote on ratification of the Genocide Treaty. While not nearly as well known as either the SALT or Panama treaties that will also come before the Senate, the Genocide Treaty nonetheless engenders just as much controversy. The agreement, the full title of which is the Convention on Presentation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, originally appeared in the form of a resolution before the United Nations. Initiated in 1948, it entered into force on January 12, 1951, after being ratified by twenty nations.

With the support of the Truman administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty in 1950. After carefully studying the document and its possible implications, the Committee refused to send the treaty to the Senate floor. Neither Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, nor Johnson revived the treaty. Not until February, 1970, under President Nixon, did an administration again send the treaty to the Senate for ratification.

Another series of hearings were held in 1970 and 1971 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Finally, on March 6, 1973, the Committee approved the treaty with three supplementary understandings and one declaration. The Senate debated the merits of the treaty for one week in February, 1974, but by votes of 55-36 and 55-38 failed to invoke cloture and vote on the treaty itself. At that time over one-third of the Senators indicated they would vote against ratification.

Without holding any additional hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee again recommended that the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the treaty on April 13, 1976. The Senate failed to take any action on the measure in the remainder of the session.

Following his inauguration, President Carter, in a speech before the United Nations, pledged to work for the adoption of the treaty. On May 24th and 26th, 1977, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearings on the Genocide Treaty. But the Committee failed to approve of

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the treaty during the first session of the 95th Congress so it will not appear on the Senate floor until sometime in 1978, probably following the disposition of the Panama Canal Treaties.

The Genocide Treaty consists of 19 separate articles. Only the first nine of these deal with terms of the treaty with the remaining ten being entirely procedural in nature. The basic language and purpose of the treaty has remained essentially the same since its original introduction in 1950. As the 1973 Foreign Relations Committee report stated: "The purpose of the treaty is to make genocide an international crime, whether committed during peace or war." Controversy over the treaty surrounds the language of each of the first nine articles. Thus in the following analysis each of these sections is dealt with separately.

I. Article I of the treaty simply states the general jurisdiction of the treaty in the following manner:

> The contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

The questions concerning both prudence and jurisdiction have arisen about the Article. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report in 1973 stated that genocide would simply be added to a list of other international agreements such "as protection of submarine cables, pelagic sealing, oil pollution, and antisocial conduct like slave trading, and production and trade in narcotics."

Basically the critics have contended that matters involving human rights questions should be under essentially domestic jurisdiction and that the use of the treaty-making power in such areas is inappropriate.

In September, 1949 the A.B.A. House of Delegates found:

> That the suppression and punishment of genocide under an international convention to which it is proposed the United States shall be a party involves important constitutional questions which the proposed convention . . . does not resolve . . . in a manner consistent with our form of government. (Hearings, 1971, p. 16)

II. Article II defines the "Acts Constituting Genocide" in the following manner:

> In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,

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ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

1. Due to the vagueness of the terminology used in this section, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee appended two understandings to this Article by stating the "intent to destroy" section must "affect a substantial part of the group concerned" and that "mental harm" meant "permanent impairment of mental facilities."

2. Placing such understandings or reservations on the treaty have been questioned by some authorities. In testimony on the treaty, Alfred J. Schweppe, of the A.B.A., stated that the "substantial part of the group" understanding " is in direct negation of the text." Moreover, he noted that in 1950 the State Department itself "admitted or agreed that part of a group could be a single individual." (Hearings, 1971, pp. 55-56) Rather than have such understandings which "so emasculated the convention as to leave nothing substantial" he said the A.B.A.'s Peace and Law Committee believed "it would be better to have the convention sent back to the United Nations for appropriate changes." (Hearings, 1971, p. 69)

3. The key word, according to the Committee Report, in this section is "intent" and thus it states that "allegations that school busing, birth control clinics, lynchings, police actions with respect to Black Panthers and the incidents at My Lai constitute genocide" have no merit. Without proof of intent to destroy the entire group the genocide convention is inapplicable.

The issue of whether the treaty could apply to actions in wartime has been a principal source of contention. Since the agreement applies to soldiers in wartime who intend as a part of their mission to destroy "in part" another nation, critics contend that the soldiers may be charged and tried for genocide by the enemy country they are fighting. Thus the country, such as North Vietnam several years ago, could point to this treaty signed by the United States as justification for prosecuting American servicemen for genocide.

4. Section (b) of Article II has caused still more controversy. In order

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to clarify the nature of the charge of causing "mental harm" the Committee added their understanding on "permanent impairment of mental facilities." Nonetheless, Sen. Ervin continued to object to the vague language:

> What mental harm means in this context is totally incomprehensible, and what psychological acts or omissions are made punishable in this context are left in obscurity.

In order to illustrate the nature of the terminological problems, some have cited the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the education of black children in separate black schools

> may effect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . and has a tendency to retard their education and mental development.

Thus using our own judicial opinions as a handle, Eberhard P. Deutsch of the A.B.A. contended that an international tribunal could contend "that any form of local segregation is within the definition of the international crime of genocide under the convention. (Hearings, 1971, p. 19)

5. A final question raised in conjunction with the definition of genocide is the absence of certain categories of crimes. In the history of negotiating the precise terminology of the agreement, certain key phrases were eliminated and others added. The United States strongly advocated including the phrase "with the complicity of government" in the definition. Moreover, the original United Nations declaration against genocide adopted in December, 1946, referred to genocide "committed on religious, political or any other grounds."

Many people felt that the "complicity of the government" in genocidal actions should be specifically prohibited. Similarly, the attempt to exterminate an entire group for purely political reasons seemed an appropriate area to cover in the treaty. However, under pressure from the Soviet Union and other communist governments the Western nations agreed not only to exclude these particular categories of crimes, but also to include the phrases "part of a group" and "mental harm."

Since the government in Communist countries pervade every aspect of society and the principal crimes allegedly committed against the state are "political," many authorities felt that the Soviet Union and her allies effectively isolated themselves from any future prosecution under the terms of the agreement.

Speaking on behalf of the treaty as drafted, the U.S. Ambassador to the

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U.N. at the time the U.S. signed the treaty, Arthur Goldberg, agreed that the term "political" should have been included, but stated that in the end "we settled for the best treaty possible." (Hearings, 1971, p. 115.)

Alfred Schweppe of the A.B.A. summarized the treaty negotiations in this manner:

> All in all, ours was a pathetic performance. Out came a convention that the Soviets could readily approve, and which surely will cause us, if it becomes the supreme law of the land (superseding state laws and constitutions and existing laws of Congress), endless trouble. (Hearings, 1971, p. 62.)

III. Article III of the convention lists the following acts as punishable:

(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

Sections (c) and (e) under this article have raised questions concerning possible conflicts with the American Bill of Rights. The Committee Report dealt with this problem by noting that the Supreme Court drew a clear line "between protected speech and prohibited direct and immediate incitement to action." Thus the Court said in the 1969 of *Brandenburg v. Ohio* that speech could not be proscribed or forbidden by a State "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." The Committee felt the Genocide provisions would not conflict with this interpretation (Report, p. 8). At the time of the drafting of the document, representatives of the United States attempted to delete section (c) but were defeated.

Senator Ervin has cited other Supreme Court decisions and raised questions about the precise meaning of the language in this Article:

> If the convention is ratified, public officials and private citizens of our land will be subject to punishment in Federal courts or possibly in international penal tribunals to be established under Article VI if they are guilty of the undefined offense designated as "complicity in genocide." What is "complicity in genocide?" The convention does not say. (Hearings, 1971, p. 6).

When the genocide convention originally came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1950, it attached the following reservation to this

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section which has subsequently been removed:

> That the United States Government understands and construes the words 'complicity in genocide' appearing in Article III of this convention to mean participation before and after the fact and aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime of genocide (Hearings, 1971, p. 6).

IV. Article IV deals with punishments to be applied if the treaty is ratified:

> Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

This section has simply revived the controversy over the scope of the entire treaty. The Senate Committee felt that "the convention would have been stronger" if "directed at governments as well as individuals." But the Committee went on to note "that there exists no present means in international law to punish a government in power." When you can take no action against a government, except if it has surrendered unconditionally in war, then critics contend that the treaty becomes virtually meaningless as an effective preventative instrument and thus may be used for only propaganda purposes.

V. Article V provides that all governments adopting the Genocide Convention will enact "the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions. . . and provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in Article III."

This led the Committee to incorporate in the resolution of ratification a declaration that the United States "will not deposit its instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation. . . has been enacted."

As the Committee Report states, this section would require the United States to add "certain acts as Federal crimes." A draft of implementing legislation was proposed by Senator Javits in the 2nd session of the 92nd Congress in the form of S.3182.

Justice Goldberg and others have stated that through the implementing legislation all of the questions raised about the treaty can be resolved to the satisfaction of the critics. However, unlike the treaty itself, the implementing legislation will have to pass both the Senate and the House, but then only a simple majority vote of approval will be required. Thus opponents of the

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sections of the treaty can prevail with one-third of the votes, but will need a majority against ratification to clarify the agreement through the implementing legislation.

VI. Article VI provides that persons under the convention will be tried for their offenses

> by a competent tribunal of the State *in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.*

Once again the Senate felt compelled to add a clarifying understanding so "that nothing in Article VI shall affect the right of any State to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the State." (Report, p. 10.) However, the spokesman for the American Bar Association submitted

> that such an understanding would, under no circumstances, deprive any other country of its concurrent jurisdiction over the trial of such individuals, especially since the understanding pointedly fails to negate the United States, under Article VII, to grant extradition of its citizens for trial in other countries with which it has extradition treaties.

Since under this article individuals are tried in the country in which the alleged offense has been committed, critics have contended that Americans charged under the treaty would not necessarily have the same legal safeguards they have under American law. *Moreover, considerable concern has surrounded the possible creation of an international penal tribunal whose composition could turn it into more of a political than legal body. This could be created by executive order.*

Due to this section, Senator Ervin said that Americans, for example, captured by the North Vietnamese could have been tried and punished in the courts of North Vietnam. "No sophistry can erase this obvious interpretation of the Genocide Convention." (Hearings, p. 7).

Finally, the question of concurrent jurisdiction has arisen. Different agencies could presumably bring different charges for the same offense that would lead to apparently overlapping jurisdiction. One cannot be subject to the same charge in two jurisdictions; but one could, for example, be tried for murder in a State and at the same time charged before an international forum for genocide.

The main protection against such apparent double jeopardy, which

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would constitute denial of conventional civil liberties, would be the failure of one country to extradite an individual to the scene of the alleged crime. As the Senate understanding emphasizes, the State retains the right to try individuals "for acts committed outside the State."

VII. Nonetheless, Article VII provides for extradition of individuals charged with crimes covered by the Genocide Convention. This article asserts that the crimes cannot be excluded from possible extradition proceedings for political reasons. Thus "the Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force."

During the Senate consideration of this section, Senator Cooper offered a reservation to prevent the extradition of any U.S. Citizen "unless the Secretary of State determines such person is guaranteed all the constitutional rights of an accused under our Federal laws." The full Committee voted 7-6 to table this proposed addition.

VIII. Article VIII provides a role for the United Nations in carrying out the treaty:

> Any contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

At the time of initial consideration of the treaty, the United Nations undoubtedly had much greater prestige and moral force than it does at this point in time. The Committee Report stated that genocide in the form of mass murder "would either jeopardize human rights provisions of the charter or pose a threat to world peace." In either instance, jurisdiction of the U.N. in this area would be appropriate. Nonetheless, the Committee felt that the scope for U.N. action would be limited by Article 2, section 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. This provision proscribed intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . ." (Report, p. 12).

In recent years, critics point out, the composition of the United Nations has changed drastically and actions taken by the U.N. have often been completely irresponsible. The definition of "domestic jurisdiction" has failed to prevent United Nations interference in many nations' internal affairs.

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The Committee Report noted that "spurious charges" could be made in the U.N. with or without the American accession to the Genocide Treaty. But Eberhard Deutsch of the A.B.A. drew a distinction in the hearings by stating that:

> a mere solution condemning us is one thing, but under the convention they may take such other action against the United States by way of sanctions or otherwise, if we were parties to that convention and such a situation arose. (Hearings, 1971, p. 82).

IX. The final source of dispute deals with Article IX concerning the "Settlement of Disputes" under the Genocide Convention. Article IX reads as follows:

> Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

The Committee Report noted that such cases would fall under Article 36(1) of the Court's statute and not under Article 36(2). Thus the Connally amendment which only related to Article 36(2) would not apply to any cases arising under the Genocide Convention. Critics of the treaty dissent from this Article on precisely the grounds that it:

> clearly overrides the Connally Amendment, and subjects the United States to the unreserved jurisdiction of the International Court of justices as to all matters involving the 'interpretation, application or fulfillment' of the Genocide Convention. (Hearings, 1971, p. 46)

Supporters of the treaty note that all Communist-bloc countries have objected to Article IX and thus "the United States could invoke the Communist-bloc reservation in its own behalf in cases brought by members of the bloc." (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, 1971, p. 13) Furthermore, the Committee Report noted that only states can bring cases before the World Court and that the Court has no enforcement powers. Nonetheless, Senator Erwin has argued that:

> Under this Article the International Court of Justice would be empowered to decree that the President of the United States, as Chief Executive Officer of the United States, had interpreted and applied the provisions of the convention incorrectly and by so doing impose

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> upon the President of the United States its notions as to how the convention should be interpreted and enforced; the power to adjudge that legislation enacted by Congress to give effect to the provisions of the convention was insufficient to fulfill the obligation imposed upon it by the convention; and the power to adjudge that the Supreme Court of the United States and Federal courts inferior to it had interpreted and applied the provisions was insufficient to fulfill the obligation imposed upon it by the convention; and the power to adjudge that the Supreme Court of the United States and Federal courts inferior to it had interpreted and applied the provisions of the convention incorrectly and by so doing require these tribunals to apply its notions as to how such provisions should be interpreted and applied to future cases coming before them.

Moreover, if the United States would simply ignore any adverse rulings from the World Court, as some have contended, then Ervin believes the United States would also be ignoring her solemn obligation under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that "each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." (Hearings, 1971, p. 8).

As the above analysis of the first nine articles of the Genocide Treaty indicates, an enormous range of controversies have arisen over the nature and meaning of the particular provisions of the agreement. The nature of the American legal system, in which treaties become the supreme law of the land, makes the ratification of treaties by the United States fundamentally different from that of most other countries. Thus the actions of other nations regarding the treaty should have little bearing on the eventual disposition of it by the United States Senate. However, even the interest of the rest of the world in this treaty has diminished greatly in recent years.

A total of 83 nations have ratified the convention, or only about half the nations in the world. This list includes thirteen communist countries that only ratified the treaty with such severe reservations as to make the document meaningless. Moreover, almost all of the ratifying nations did so immediately after its promulgation. In the past seven years only eight nations have ratified the treaty: the Bahamas, Fiji, East Germany, Ireland, Lesotho, Mali, Rwanda and Tonga. As this list indicates, few major new nations have become parties to the agreement recently. Besides the United States, several other major nations have refused to ratify the agreement

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including the largest nation in Africa, Nigeria, and three of the four most populous nations in the Orient: Japan, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China.

Formal assent to the agreement has apparently had no impact upon the nature of nations and policies pursued by their governments. Thus in the entire history of the agreement no significant effort has ever been made to implement its terms upon some violator. It has only been used for propaganda purposes. In fact one of the principal supporters of the treaty, Senator Proxmire, has argued that American ratification is necessary to "help spur renewed interest in the treaty among the newly emergent nations of the world." (Hearings, 1977, p. 3) But the failure of the current signatories to ever press charges against obvious violators of the treaty, such as Communist Cambodia, only indicates the apparent unworkability of its provisions. The record of 26 years of actual operation of the treaty mechanism reveals the irrelevance of bold principles being translated into meaningful legal codes in international politics. Thus the treaty is fundamentally a political document for most nations and only in the United States must it be studied as a serious legal document.

As a legal document the Genocide Treaty fails to conform to the American constitutional system of protection of the rights of citizens. Even supporters of the treaty do not believe that the agreement will enhance the rights of Americans. Thus potential risks arise pertaining to the protection of American rights under this treaty through the prospective extradiction of citizens charged under the agreement, double jeopardy for crimes already prosecuted in the United States, and disputes about particular provisions being resolved by some international tribunal. Given the lack of interest by the international community in the Genocide Treaty, such risks may be minimal at present. But with the general drift of opinion in international organizations away from constitutional law and the growing influence of the communist bloc nations, the Genocide Treaty will much more likely to be used in the future for propaganda purposes aginst anti-communist countries than for serious efforts to curtail genuine genocidal actions in the world.

* Most quotations in this paper derive from the hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 on the Genocide Treaty and the Report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the treaty in 1973. Thus the notation "Hearings" or "Report" used throughout this essay refers to those documents.

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A New Strategy for the West

Daniel O. Graham



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EUROCOMMUNISM AND POPULAR FRONT MOVEMENTS

By Count Hans Huyn

"Freedom or Socialism" – so went the slogan under which the Federal Republic of Germany's Christian Social Union (CSU) conducted itself in the Republic-wide federal election campaign in the autumn of 1976. We made our point. We managed to make clear to public opinion that a battle is going on. A struggle in all spheres of life: in social and internal political affairs; in economic and financial affairs; in cultural affairs and the media. A battle between socialistic and free decisions – or solutions. Our success is on the record. We got our message across to the public. In the 1976 federal election the CSU won more than 60% of the votes in Bavaria.

"Freedom or Socialism" – our campaign slogan – was not simply to get tossed, along with the torn-up election-campaign posters, onto the rubbish pile after voting ceased on October 3, 1976. On the contrary: the battle over this issue goes on in Germany. More than that: the battle continues not only in Germany but in all Europe – yes, even throughout the whole world.

"Freedom or Socialism" – this motto is not meant as an oversimplification. Naturally we too have our Social Democrats who are determined opponents of Moscow-type Socialism. But the left wing of the Social Democrats keeps growing stronger – the wing that champions co-operation with, and solidarity of action with the Communists, the wing that, in so doing, becomes covertly a pace-setter along the road to Moscow's goal.

"Freedom or Socialism" – this slogan has become an international political controversy for behind the politics of Socialism lies the amassed might of Moscow. Moscow works in many ways: through the classic instruments of international diplomacy; through the conventional nuclear and rocket armament; through the burgeoning Red Navy, now to be seen on all the seas of the world; through the erection of bases worldwide; through the expansion of zones of influence in Europe, Asia, Africa and America; through the global operations of the KGB secret service; through espionage, infiltration, subversion, and terrorism; through willing helpers – those Trojan horses – or Trojan asses.

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Against this background, two tactics stand out. One is that of the wolf in sheep's clothing – "Eurocommunism." The other is the tactic of the "popular front" – the search for genuine sheep. Once such sheep are found, the Communists first make an alliance with them, then subsequently ally with them and gulp them down.

It was just 40 years ago that a popular front, comprising its Socialist parties of the left allied to the Communists – sought to establish Socialism in Spain. Just 40 years ago – in July 1937 – a German Socialist of the left in Paris gave a lecture with the title "A Year of War and Revolution in Spain." He said: "A purifying storm has cleansed the churches and the cloisters . . . The use of Russians to wipe out Franco was an extraordinarily progressive occurrence . . . In order to salvage the revolutionary achievements, we need, within the framework of broad unity of action, a bringing together of the consciously socialist forces from the socialist, communist, anarchistic and independent camps – together in a solid alliance of mutual protection." The text of this lecture can be examined in the archives of the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. The author was with the Red side in the Spanish Civil War. His name is Willy Brandt. Today he directs the Socialist International – which, not only in Spain but also in other countries, champions the legitimation of the Communist Party. The selfsame Willy Brandt is chairman of the German Social Democrats. As such, he maintains close links with the so-called "Eurocommunists." This he is doing, for example, in Rome. There the Social Democratic Party of Germany recently carried on conspiratorial international cooperation of the popular-front variety. In Rome the German SPC – and this in the "via delle botteghe oscure" or "street of shady business" – prepared those Eastern Treaties which Brezhnev was later to term a great victory for Moscow and the Kremlin. Sometimes Willy Brandt veils his attitudes; but he has remained faithful to his earlier popular-front policy. As late as December 9, 1971, at an Oslo news conference in connection with the bestowal of the Nobel Peace Prize, Willy Brandt said frankly: "I believe my basic views have not changed."

Eurocommunism

What is Eurocommunism – this sheep's clothing for the Communist wolf? Frane Barbieri, who first coined the expression "Eurocommunism," said in Deutschlandarchiv of April 1977: "I chose the expression 'Euro-

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communism' because I consider the phrase geographically specific, but ideologically indeterminate . . . Just because it isn't clear what Eurocommunism actually is, I ask myself: Does a European Community (EC) ruled by Eurocommunism remain the EC, in the sense in which the Community was created? The Eurocommunists themselves say they want to keep the Community independent of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. If one goes by the programme in the Spanish manifesto, one can lay at the Eurocommunists' door an intention gradually to Europeanize the Soviet system. But that is an illusion. A Eurocommunistic Europe would certainly mean Europe's Sovietization."

Superficial observers see November 15, 1975, as the birthday of Eurocommunism. It was on this day that the French and Italian Communist Parties issued a joint declaration. In it, these parties supposedly agreed to a pluralism of political parties; the free creation of majorities; the democratic function of the state.

Yet you need to have a very short memory to believe that this is something new in the history of Communism. None less than the Communist pioneer, Friedrich Engels wrote in his foreword to the 3rd edition of the Karl Marx's monograph about class warfare in France (written in 1895): "We have fooled ourselves in our concept of history; deceived ourselves with the idea that the victory of Communism was to be ensured by mounting the barricades . . . The irony of world history turns everything upside down: We, the 'revolutionaries', soon we shall be more flourishing through legal means than through illegal means, or through revolution. The law-and-order parties, as they called themselves, are being ruined by a legal situation they themselves brought about. Meanwhile, we thrive on this same legislation — developing sturdy muscles and rosy cheeks; looking like eternal life. Provided we are not so crazy as to do them a favour by letting ourselves get involved in street fighting, we shall absolutely certainly break through the fatal legality aspect, and ensure the triumph of Communism."

Let it not be objected that Engel was writing before Lenin's day, during an epoch that as yet had known no Soviet overlordship in Russia, no Red Army, and no claim by Moscow to ideological primacy. Consider what happened in 1945. A few weeks after the German Wehrmacht's unconditional surrender, as the Red Army, under the Stalin Government, pushed forward to the Elbe. Under the eyes of the Soviet occupation power, the Communist Party of Germany issued a proclamation stating that: "We take the view that it would be wrong to force the Soviet system on Germany.

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For this course does not correspond to the current conditions of development in Germany. Instead, we take the view that the German people's determinant interests, given the current situation, prescribe another course. That way is the creation of an anti-fascist, democratic regime – a parliamentary, democratic republic with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people."

Eurocommunism is therefore a new Communist tactic. What became of the 1945 plan for a German way to Communism "with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people?" Today we see the answer in the Berlin Wall, the barbed wire, the orders to shoot – these aspects of the state-imposed regime of terror. Yet the state calls itself: "German Democrat Republic."

Secondly we should note that today's Eurocommunists take no more seriously their protestations of pluralism and democracy than was earlier the case. Let us listen to these Eurocommunists themselves. This is what the Italian Communist leader Berlinguer said in 1969 at the Italian Communist Party's XIIth congress: "There will never be a break with Moscow. We say yes to democratic centralism and to Leninism." In 1973, at the party congress: "We're not suffering from parliamentary cretinism; we need parliament in the time of transition to socialism." And he continued: "The highest form of the class struggle remains armed struggle." Then: "We are under no illusion about idolizing the law." The same year, 1973, he told the Central Committee of his party: "We are fighting – first – for a Western Europe that is democratic, independent and peaceful . . . We want to reach interim goals. In principle, we're not against force . . ." During a visit to East Berlin, he declared to SED (East German Communist) leader Honecker: "Our feelings, ideals and main goals are the same as yours." At the XIV party congress of the Communist Party International on March 18 1975, he presented the socialist countries of Eastern Europe as models. There, he said, there had been further improvements in the popular living standard and in the civic and cultural development of the populace. Moreover (he added), it is world-known that in these countries a "higher moral climate" holds sway.

Like Berlinguer, Secretary-General Marchais of the French Communist Party sets up the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe as a model. In his book "Le défi démocratique," which came out in Paris in 1973, it is true he says (page 126 ff.): "The present, the activity, the role as advance guard of the Communist Party in no sense involves the negation of other parties."

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To examplify his point, Marchais then cites the co-operation by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917 – their arrangement with the social-revolutionary elements of the left – and comments: "It would be laughable were one today to demand that the Soviets abstain from the political system, from supporting the system that came into existence – and to do so in a way that would mean a return, in their country, to a multiple-party system. This after 55 years during which a society has been built up in which class tensions have been completely dismantled – in which they have disappeared."

Nevertheless – so Marchais continues in his book – there is no compelling need to regard the Soviet experience a model for other countries. Instead he introduces as a model of a multiple-party rule the so-called German Democratic Republic. In it, as in Bulgaria, "organized and influential non-Communist parties currently are participating by the side of the Communists in the political leadership." Everyone who knows the situation in East Berlin or in Bulgaria also knows that such "non-Communist" parties are simply political puppets, fully controlled by the Communists.

Today the exponents of Eurocommunism have no more broken with Moscow than did the German Communists in 1945. In 1945 they merely seek to invade the Western structure and to hollow out the Atlantic alliance. In Moscow they came to the simple recognition that without a minimum of tactical programming, free Europe cannot be made ripe for the socialist take-over. The Eurocommunists of today are the true interpreters of Lenin's instructions on Communist tactics. It was he who said, at the VII party congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in his speech about war and peace, in 1918: "If a person cannot adjust; if a person is not capable of creeping on his belly through the slime – then he is not a revolutionary but a wind-bag. And I make that suggestion not because I find it pleasant to move ahead in this fashion but out of necessity: There is no other way. History has not pleasantly ordained that the revolution should mature everywhere at the same time."

Nothing could be clearer than the words of the Soviet Professor Michail Woslenski, in the weekly *Die Zeit* (No. 47/1976): "The widely prevalent view in the West that Eurocommunism is alsmost a kind of Social Democracy is wishful thinking in its purest forms . . . Berlinguer characterizes Socialist in the U.S.S.R. as a 'great victory' that 'opens up an entirely new way to not only the people of the Soviet Union but also all of mankind'. In

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brief: Nothing justifies concluding that there is a distancing of 'Eurocommunism' from real Socialism. Therefore there is absolutely no foundation to Western speculation that the Soviet Communist Party does not want 'Eurocommunists' to come to power in their respective countries. This naive supposition testifies to an almost funny failure to recognize the political strategy of the Communist world movement. Then is everything only a matter of tactics? The term 'tactic' is not, in Marxism-Leninism, derogatory. 'Eurocommunists' are Communists. They make no secret of it; they say right out that they are pursuing Communist goals in their countries." Thus the Soviet Professor Michail Woslenski.

The Polish Professor Leszek Kolakowski, who left Communist Poland some years ago and is living in Oxford, observed in an essay published in *Spiegel* of May 2 1977, that the Eurocommunists have not cut themselves off from Moscow. He went on: "The decisive aspect is that, as long as the schism has not been completely effected, politically and ideologically, it does not depend on the Italian Communists whether they, once they are in power, will be in a position to safeguard their independence from the Soviet Union. Should a few leaders resist accepting this dependence, they will simply be replaced by other, more reliable ones . . . It is the same wherever Communism has come to power. The same whether this taking power was from internal strength or via foreign power. In both kinds of situation, not only bourgeois or civic freedoms and democratic institutions were done away with; in addition, a totalitarian form of social organization was forced through . . . Up to now we have been lacking in empirical proof that a democratic Communism is possible in the first place. All available evidence points to the contrary."

Thus we see that the Eurocommunist sheepskin on the Communist wolf is shabby, tattered, and full of holes. Yet in Moscow and Rome, in Paris and Madrid, the Communists, nevertheless, are agreed that it is necessary to don the Eurocommunist sheepskin in Western Europe so as to dupe the foolish sheep into a popular front – as long as there are sheep that are gladly duped! Representing his Eurocommunist comrades, the Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carillo said in June 1976: "For us Communists, the fact that we are battling in the Communist countries has its current reasoning. We seek an understanding with all socialist, Social Democratic, Christian, radical and other democratically minded forces. The goal is to create a bloc, a movement with its roots in the people. In turn the aim becomes fostering the growth to maturity of conditions for the

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Socialist repatterning of society."

With these words the Spanish Communist Party leader Carillo announced the main goal of Moscow's Western policy. Naturally the Kremlin also is concerned lest the Eurocommunist tactics, becoming known in the countries already controlled by Communism, might have unwished-for psychological effects on classic Communism's own vassals, but they have calculated and allowed consciously into the bargain: Eurocommunism and popular fronts in Western Europe – and thus the conquest of all Europe for the Soviet Union – have priority over the existing ideological differences. In April 1976, Boris Ponomarjov, affirmed in the Soviet magazine *Kommunist* that the creation of popular-front governments in Western Europe has priority over all ideological differences between the Moscow headquarters and the Communist parties of France and Italy. The thing is to achieve "joint emergence of Communists and Socialists" with their aim "a platform of unified action."

Popular Fronts

The Communist strategy of the popular front developed from the Bolshevist promotion of the unity or solidarity front, the organization for action of the working class. This concept was spelled out in detail for the first time in the so-called unity front theses of the executive committee of the Communist International, December 18 1921. Only a few months later, between April 2 and 25, 1922, a conference took place in Berlin, with participants including Socialists from Western countries and Communists. The Belgian Socialist Emile Vandervelde said at that time in Berlin: "They appeal for unity; they propose that we make reality of the unity front; they conceal that the thinking behind this is: first to disarm us, then to choke or poison us."

In July 1934, Socialists and Communists formed an alliance in France. A few months later the French Communist Party chairman Thorez called for extension of this unity concept of the working class within the bourgeois camp – under the term "popular front."

In the summer of 1935 the VII World Congress of the Communist International convened in Moscow. Elected there was a new Secretary-General of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitroff. He expressly identified himself with the popular front, and characterized it as "the tactic of the Trojan horse."

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In accordance with the French model, and with the demands of the Communist International, a popular front was organised in Spain. A year later, in 1936, a conference was held in the Hotel Lutetia in Paris. Its aim: to make preparations for a popular front in Germany. The call to do this was signed by persons including Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Herbert Wehner and Willy Brandt.

Following the events of 1945, Moscow continued its strategy of the Communist popular front. The goal remains always the same. This one can read even today in the official Soviet Communist Party course of lectures published by an authors' collective under Professor Afanassjev, a member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee: "Part of the tactics of the Communist Party are to deceive Social Democratic forces in the workers' movement; to tack about; and to pursue a course that in this way leads to the victory of Communism."

Through these measures, Moscow is ensuring its domination of Central Europe. The Socialists and Social Democrats "hold the stirrups" so the Communists can mount and ride. In the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany the Social Democrats and the Communist Party merged on April 22 1946, becoming the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of Germany. In Hungary, the same thing happened. There, in August 1948, the Socialists and Communists made common cause as the United Hungarian Workers' Party. In Czechoslovakia the Social Democrats merged with the Communist Party April 17 1949. In Poland, in 1947, the two socialist parties, merged to form United Polish Workers' Party. All other parties were prohibited, sucked up, or allowed to remain as part a mere facade.

Regarding free Europe too, the Communists are firming up their strategy for taking over power. In 1966 the Vienna conference of West European Communist parties demanded:

— Co-operation between and among Communist and Socialist — respectively, Social Democratic — parties of the West European countries; as well as the establishment of contacts with the Socialist International.

— Weakening of the Western defence alliance.

— Infiltration, as regards personnel as well as political and psychological aspects, European institutions and organizations.

— Infiltration, especially in Southern Europe, of the Catholic Church.

Looking at the tactic of the popular front, Communism has found it good, and has said so. Official approval came, for instance, during a Communist conference held in 1966 in Vienna, to appraise the results of

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this tactic. Deputy Director Korionov of the Division for International Relations of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committeee took a joint stand with ex-editor-in-chief Franzev of the Prague-published international Communist magazine "Problems of Peace and Socialism." They expressly praised the Communist parties of Italy and France for being furthest ahead in the move for "unity for action."

On April 24 1967, the Carlsbad Conference of all European Communist parties addressed itself to "the working class; to the Socialist and Social Democratic parties." It appealed to these groups "to unite, and in every country – on the Continental level as well – jointly with Communists to carry out wide-ranging campaigns and mass actions. The operations were also to include trade unions. According to this Communist declaration at Carlsbad: "New and positive tendencies are emerging in the Socialist and Social Democratic movement. These are tendencies that speak, in some West European countries, for international relaxation and for teamwork with the Communists."

Here we have to do with a fine distinction and a perfecting of the Soviet tactic: up to this point, since the 1930s, we had been facing, it is true, an international popular-front governments in individual countries. This remained the continuing goal after Carlsbad, with a "but" – now there was to be international co-operation by Communists and Socialists of various countries in a targeted action to reach concrete goals. The major goal was and is, the achievement of a Socialist Europe.

The Communist appeal from Carlsbad of 1967 was taken up by the German Social Democratic Party. They in fact transformed into action the concept of the international popular-front teamwork of Socialists and Communists. This co-operation began with teamwork by the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Italian Communist Party. A crucial phase was from the autumn of 1967 to the spring of 1968. During that period, party delegations of German Social Democrats carried on secret conferences. They were attended by, among others, Egon Bahr, later to be State Secretary in the Chancellery under Willy Brandt and (from the end of 1976) executive manager of the SPD; by Egon Franke, now Minister for Intra-German Relations; and by Leo Bauer, one-time veteran Communist and later chief adviser to Willy Brandt. The secret talks included contacts with Italian Communists to implement the plans of the Communist Carlsbad conference – goals of European Communist policy for Europe, goals dictated by Moscow. These secret conferences between SPD and the Italian

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Communist Party (KPI) took place behind the back of Chancellor Kiesinger, a CDU man who created a Government coalition with the SPD under Willy Brandt. These secret talks were broadened to triangular talks with the East Berlin SED. During these conspiratorial negotiations, the SPD granted the conditions set by Ulbricht and Brezhnev. In turn, their conditions led almost literally to the formulation of the Moscow Treaty between Bonn and Moscow. On November 11, 1971, Berlinguer told the Central Committee of the Communist Party International: "Here we have a recognized merit of our party. The party contributed from the beginning – a development that led to the break with the Adenauer policies – to the maturing of this new orientation of a European popular-front policy. This new European framework brings a deep-going change in direction for Socialism. It is a fact – and there is an important confirmation of this in the latest encounters with the SPD young people's movement – that, in the ranks of European Social Democracy, too, there are forces that set as their goal the doing away with the current concept." And on February 7 1973, Berlinguer said to his party's Central Committee: "The new development, the change in direction, has taken place thanks to the policy of the Social Democratic Party of Germany."

"Scratch my back; I'll scratch yours," is the idea presented in the significant study prepared by Horst Ehmke, formerly Minister in the Chancellery and SPD member of the Bundestag. In the autumn of 1976 he had held long discussions with Berlinguer in Rome. Furthermore, in the study, the SPD politician argues that it is "this party – the KPI" that the laws of democracy "are implemented."

Which party has really changed – Social Democrats or Communists? This statement throwing light on that question was made over Radio Moscow in February 1976; it is absolutely clear: "Between Communists, including those in government, and some Socialist and Social Democratic parties contacts and alliances have been made. For this, the Communists have not needed to examine or to change their views."

In an interview over South German Radio on July 25 1972, the Dutch Socialist Mansholt called for "concerted action by all the Socialists in Europe."

The German Young Socialists, the Jusos, are making this demand, expressed at their federal congress in Bad Godesberg in March 1973: a co-ordinated Socialist strategy in co-operation with Communist and left Socialist parties "in the capitalistic part of Europe."

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The French Communist Party is propagating (as expressed in *Humanité*) a "course towards a united Europe of the workers;" the conducting of "class warfare at the level of a capitalistic Europe;" and "collective security on the Continent" in "co-operation with Socialists on the European level." The aim here: "to make full use of the new situation in Europe, a situation that has come about through detente, peaceful co-existence" and the Eastern policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Helmut Schmidt asserts (in *Time* magazine, May 1976) that participation by the Communists in government, in Italy for example, would not amount to a "catastrophe."

In the Communist "Blättern für deutsche und internationale Politik" Axel Peter writes in 1975: "The revolution was victorious in Portugal only because we systematically applied the conclusions of the VII Comintern congress of 1935 – to use the strategy of the Trojan horse."

On the occasion of the 40th anniversary celebration of the VII Comintern congress in 1935, at which the popular-front policy was created, Willy Brandt visits the Soviet Union. Expressly because of his visit, celebration of the 40th anniversary is extended to cover four weeks. Drawing a balance on this Willy Brandt visit, *Vorswärts*, the official SPD organ, says on June 10 1975: "The Social Democrats are being included in the Kremlin's co-existence policy so as to create the broadest-possible base in Europe, and so as to firm up the Communist-Social Democratic camp vis-à-vis China. Regarding the SPD, the Kremlin surely hopes, in addition, to be able, through its chairman, Willy Brandt, to use the party as a motor in Eastern policy." Here the official newspaper of the German Social Democrats also speaks openly of a common Communist-Social Democratic camp."

Constantly more Socialists in Europe are moving towards Communism. Revealing indeed are quotations from the correspondence among Brandt, Kreisky and Palme. These excerpts have been published by the *Europäische Verlagsanstalt*. The Socialist Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky says: "We must put the market economy behind us." Willy Brandt contributes this: "Market economy is no solution; social planning is necessary." Brandt also goes into the concept of replacing the revolution with "reforms," asserting: "At some point the quantity of the reforms becomes expressed in quality." He means, he explains: "One must only make enough reforms in order to arrive at a new quality – that is, the quality of Socialism."

In Sweden, Olof Palme also strives to achieve this same quality, via a Socialist government – which was able to exist only through Communist

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tolerance.

In the British Labour Party, too, the Communist undertow is already so strong that the party took an unsual step. In 1976 it invited, as an official guest, Ponomarjov, strategist of the Soviet popular front, to Great Britain.

A clarification of the patterns of power is called for. This is a challenge, first of all, to the Social Democratic parties in free Europe. They are going to have to decide between free democracy and popular front. They shall have to decide which is more important to them: the solidarity of democrats or the solidarity of Socialists.

But it is our task, in free Europe, to make clear to the citizens of our countries what the situation really is. That Moscow uses Socialism as a tool in order to make all Europe Communist and to establish rulership – from the Urals to the Atlantic.

What we need to do is this: To send up a signal, beyond the borders of our countries, within free Europe. We need to set an example. Our aim must be the solidarity of all liberty-minded and politically active Europeans. In the struggle between freedom and Socialism, freedom will triumph: for the peoples of Europe – especially those of them that have experienced Socialism – are our allies:

They choose freedom.

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THE PROBLEM OF MULTI-ETHNIC OR "PLURAL" SOCIETIES

By Dr. C. P. Mulder

It has been stated on various occasions in the past that the South African Government does not regard the regulation of inter-group relations as a policy intended for export to other countries. Yet, while this policy was designed to meet the demands and problems created by South African historical and current circumstances, we recognise perhaps more fully than any other countries the heterogeneity of mankind and the pluralistic and culturally diverse nature of the population of virtually every existing state in the world. Indeed, pluralism and ethnicity are the principle factors shaping the political environment of Africa, Asia and most countries in the world today.

Unfortunately, during the past decade, certain states which have flouted almost every basic principle of freedom and the rule of law have deliberately set out, with the backing and support of the Communist World, to internationalise South Africa's domestic situation so as to manufacture an excuse and a smokescreen for their real intentions – that of destroying the existing constitutional basis for the government of South Africa in favour of a Marxist take-over. The end goal is obvious, it is the suppression of this white South African nation as a distinct entity in its own right: or to put it more bluntly, genocide. Moreover, the chaos and economic disorder which is bound to follow will be disastrous for the black man in South Africa as well as for the black man in neighboring African states.

What has made the situation even worse, is the fact that the industrialised states of the West are allowing themselves to become tools in the hands of those who want to undermine the political stability and economic order in South Africa despite the fact that their own existence is largely dependent on South African economic and political survival. This is not a hollow claim. The strategic metals and minerals of South Africa plus our harbour facilities constitute the Soviet goal. If they can add these to the resources they already control they would have the West at their mercy. A recent report submitted to the military committee of the North Atlantic Assembly says quite pointedly that Soviet control over the resources of Southern Africa

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would cripple Europe's industrial economy and could also gravely damage that of the United States. Yet people are encouraged from abroad, by sections of the media and of the churches, by trade unions and even by governments, to create disorder and turmoil in South Africa. The Marxists and Communists are hailed as the future leaders and black racism is openly preached.

For this reason it has become necessary for South Africa to change its attitude towards the problem of public relations and to seek actively to expose the international fraud that is being perpetrated against it. In order to overthrow South Africa, every effort is being made to undermine our life style and to thwart our efforts to safeguard the identity not only of the white nation here, but also the other nations and their cultures. This can best be done by examining the problems of multi-national and multi-ethnic states, and by clarifying the South African approach to these problems through political "pluralism."

Some time ago the editor of *The Star*'s Africa News Service wrote an interesting article entitled "In the racist desert, a fragile flower of hope." This flower, he maintained, was the "newly-defined principle" of ethnicity which he also called a "new formula" that could defuse racial tensions in South West Africa/Namibia and Rhodesia. He maintained that "ethnicity" can be nurtured into a fresh ideology enabling people of all creeds, colours and cultures to achieve their aspirations while living together in complete equality, freedom and peace.

Experience has taught that one should be careful not to use the term ethnicity indiscriminately because it does not always have a benevolent connotation. Nevertheless, Professor Nathan Glazer of Harvard University recently referred to ethnicity as a "permanent force in the modern world . . . Perhaps the answer (to the existence of) multi-ethnicity in each country will be a situation in which each group has guaranteed rights and guaranteed shares in the economy, in the polity, and in social life."

It must be accepted that South Africa's domestic policies are unequivocally aiming at the realisation of the goals of separate and equal freedoms for the major societal divisions of her plural society. The policy could therefore perhaps be summed up as a quest for a democratic solution for a particular plural problem. This is the concept of "plural democracy."

The term "plural democracies" is used to denote the complex of rights and obligations that are attached to groups, ethnic and cultural or otherwise, whether they live autonomously or intermingle with other groups. Group

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rights are guaranteed. Every group, ethnic and cultural or otherwise, of whatever size, is entitled to self-determination if they so desire. The basis for this may be territorial in nature, or it may be strictly organisational. The idea of group self-determination was "invented" in Austria and also strongly advocated by Woodrow Wilson. It was unanimously endorsed by the First United Nations Symposium on The Multi-National Society held in Yugoslavia in 1964.

The degree of sovereignty vested in such self-determination necessarily varies with each case, depending upon the location, the size and capabilities of the group and its interdependence with other groups. Indeed, the sovereignty of any group is limited by the sovereignty of other groups, especially of adjoining peoples. Modes of cohabitation and co-operation must be worked out.

Each group has an inalienable right to political self-representation and to recognition as a corporate entity. Representation may, or may not, be on a proportional basis according to numbers, wealth or any other criteria.

All groups and their individual members have both minority and civil rights. This pertains to the full use of language and religion and equality in all opportunities. There is no place for discrimination, yet groups can decide for themselves on the manner in which they want to organize their lives and their relations with other groups.

Whenever, due to changes in social and technological factors, intergroup arrangements are becoming anomic, they must be changed through the exercise of self-determination by the groups concerned.

These illustrative *principles* imply a number of corollaries:

1. In states where several groups are cohabiting, no group must be denied its rights, nor its representation.
2. Even the smallest and least cohesive groups are entitled to political and legal protection of their identity.
3. Alien domination, whether exercised by direct or indirect means, is improper.
4. The right of an individual to switch his or her affiliation from one group to the other is limited by the willingness of the other group to accept this person.
5. Policies aimed at de-ethnicising or otherwise eliminating groups or elements of their culture, are improper except for customs which are incompatible with the laws and practices of civilised nations and with recognised human and civil rights, and which have been specifically out-

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lawed by international agreements.

In the foregoing enumeration of illustrative principles relating to the concept of plural democracies, the term "group" applies to fully matured and sovereign nations, ethnic communities including tribes and sub-tribal clans, as well as to any intermediary stage of development between the two extremes. It is not implied that every group, simply because it exists, has the capacity to practice full self-determination effectively. However, the principles do imply that at any given time every group has a capacity for some sort of limited self-government, and that the right to exercise this capacity must not be withheld. Moreover, where they share a common territory, the right to meaningful deliberation in such bodies where matters of mutual concern are decided applies to all groups however primitive – although to be effective, such a right may temporarily have to be implemented by trust holders.

The enumerated principles do not imply that each group will always be able to enjoy a geographical separation and a consequent independence. Nor is the contrary implied, namely that independence must be denied because a particular group, in the form of an enclave or in dispersion, lives within the territory of a larger group. Plural democracies are compatible with multi-national or multi-ethnic states, with supra-national arrangements like common markets, and *a forteriori* with any bodies which conceptually are so constructed that group autonomy can be fully respected.

It is recognised that in addition to the plural factor, other factors, such as economic interdependence and common defense, transportation and public health arrangements, must be provided for.

More specifically, supra-local factors like a *lingua franca* and common legal and economic systems, are pre-requisites for the functioning of a larger state and for the effective handling of joint general problems. Supra-local arrangements appear to be compatible with plural democracy, and in fact may be required to protect group survival, e.g., in the form of defence. It is not assumed that interests and rights can always be harmonised, or that the use of power and force can always be avoided. However, this is true of other interests and rights, too, just as it is true that a violation does not negate the law that is being violated. Multi-national states must either be dissolved or else satisfy the double requirement that they implement the right to plural democracy and also provide for the effective and efficient functioning of the multi-national state.

It is not claimed that the present formulation presents any original

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philosophy. On the contrary, the policy of plural democracies is tied to, and is even an ingredient of, the idea of personal freedom, which can be traced back to ancient Greece, and perhaps further. Personal freedom is interrelated with group freedom because, as recognised by Aristotle, man is a "social animal" who needs the society of others for fulfillment, and because societies by nature tend to develop their own peculiar culture which is the nature of ethnicity. Thus Cicero took it for granted that mankind is divided into *nationes et gentes*.

Group consciousness has been accepted by social philosophers and social scientists as a fact of social life. Since Herder, the concept of nationality – in the sense of belonging to a particular nation – began to emerge as a major factor in European politics. The *Risorgimento* is a case in point.

Unfortunately, the English word "nationality" is ambiguous, and there is no adequate English equivalent for the Afrikaans term *Volk*, which stresses the concept of national solidarity and recognises that a person is not just a *homo sapiens*, but a Frenchman, a Swede, a Zulu or a Tsawana. The Afrikaans *Volk* is therefore wider in its implication than the English *Folk*, and is perhaps closer to the German *Volkstum*.

The essence of the *Volk* or national consciousness is the conviction held by groups of individuals that they belong together, and have common histories, interests and goals which are different from those of other groups, so that only a member of their own group can speak for it with legitimacy. Such consciousness of kind has reasserted itself constantly throughout history, but modern nationalism, as developed during the 19th century, linked the concept of nation to that of statehood. Definitions were devised to distinguish between the ideas of "nation" from "people," and to distinguish both of these from the concept of "tribe." Marx, for example, talked about "peoples *without* history" who to his mind had no right to their own state and were properly ruled by nations *with* history. Stalin wrote his definition of nation in such a way that groups without their own territory were not nations, and (like Jews in Russia) would not possess national representation or national rights. Such semantic confusions were often contrived to justify domination, but the confusion also developed naturally because simplistic definitions cannot hope to fit the complexity of the problem.

Following from this equation between "nation" and "statehood," the democratic movement proclaimed the individual equality of all citizens and began to apply the term "nation" in the more general sense of "state

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population." This usage is still common. Americans often refer to such mythical groups as the "Nigerian nation" or the "Soviet nation." The "people of Namibia" is another case in point.

Despite the fact that the ethnic factor is routinely recognised, for example in expressions like "le peuple francais," the semantics of most European languages conceal the difference between *populus* in the sense of population, voters, state inhabitants, and "mass of the people," on the one hand, and *gens* or *stirps*, which expressions often were translated as "race," on the other. In fact, ethnicity was often described as race, e.g., the expression "the English race," but this usage has become inappropriate because "race" is now recognised as possessing bio-genetic meanings different from ethnicity which also has cultural connotations. This further confusion was one reason why nationalism, including the nationalism of cultural groups partly or wholly under foreign domination, took an anti-democratic turn in some of its manifestations.

Nevertheless, the idea that specific groups, ethnic communities and peoples are entitled to self-government is reflected in the American Declaration of Independence and in the stimulation of national movements by Napoleon I, the Greek independence movement and the unification movements of Germany and Italy. The attempt to combine the national with the democratic principle, sometimes through plebiscite as the connecting link, was adopted by the Socialist International in 1896, and became one of the guiding ideas during the peace conferences concluding World War I, when the thoughts of Woodrow Wilson played a very important part.

With the conclusion of World War II, and particularly during the period of de-colonization, the national principle was violated frequently, and the concept of self-determination was seldom invoked. The principle that mature nations like the Ukranians are entitled to independence is still not fully accepted.

Although the charter of the United Nations refers to self-determination of peoples, it provides no definitions or explanations. Indeed, while we find therefore that the complex of ideas summarised by the *expressions* "ethnic pluralism" and "plural democracy" is quite old, the formulation of these ideas only began during the 19th century. Moreover, these formulations are not thought through logically, are incomplete with respect to the subject matter, and are *lex imperfecta* in terms of international law. During the last 12 years, the United Nations has made several efforts to correlate the principle of self-determination with other basic principles, and to strengthen

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its meaning, but those efforts have, on the whole, remained unsuccessful, partly because they were inspired by non-objective motives rooted in current international disputes.

The U.S.S.R., on its part following Lenin and Stalin, has placed great emphasis on the principle which is recognised in the Soviet constitution. However, Soviet formulations are not only defective, they are also insincere and ethnicity is viewed largely as a tool of political warfare. Still, the U.S.S.R. is organised along ethnic lines in the sense that most ethnic groups – all those living in a distinct territory – have been provided limited local self-government under the centralised direction from Moscow. But the ethnic principle is not applied consistently: there is Russification, the secession clause of the constitution is invalidated through provisions in the party statute, large ethnic groups living in dispersal are not granted personal-cultural autonomy, and the small tribal groups are allowed only highly selective representation in the Soviet of Nationalities.

It is deplorable, therefore, that in the UN debates on self-determination, the principle of self-determination has often been pressed by the Soviets and their allies as a weapon against the West, whereas the Western camp has rarely taken any initiative with respect to minority problems and in addition has sometimes assumed negative attitudes toward self-determination. There is, for example, no Western doctrine on plebiscites and plebiscite techniques.

The principle of self-determination was extremely popular fifty years ago, but it is no longer an active principle in the policies of the major Western states. It is in bad repute because it is deemed to inhibit supra-national endeavours and movements. "Forward-looking" elements which press toward a higher degree of international co-operation regard the principle of national self-determination as inimical to their purposes. Others are afraid that emphasis on self-determination might lead to conflict, especially with the U.S.S.R.

Some of the notions, ideas, and prejudices which internationally militate against the general acceptance of a policy of plural democracies include:

(i) The conviction that through the application of self-determination and more generally of plural democracy, existing states would be destroyed or paralysed and the communist strategy of "national liberation" would be facilitated. Related thereto is the UN theory and practise of sticking to existing and even to *de facto* frontiers.

(ii) Systematic oversight of the concept discussed during the League of Nations era that the principle of self-determination could be used as a base

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for peaceful change to remove causes of tension and conflict. Nevertheless, peaceful change through self-determination has been employed pragmatically during the UN period for decolonisation, albeit within the limit of pre-existing borders of former colonies. The establishment of federative structure also is expected to develop peacefully.

(iii) Scepticism that the will of populations in multi-national areas can be reliably determined. Hence reluctance to resort to plebiscites or other democratic methods that would permit implementation of the national principle.

(iv) The implicit assumption that self-determination be practised only once and the obverse fear that acts of self-determination may have to be repeated, so that emphasis on the principle would destroy world stability.

(v) The belief that there are insoluble contradictions between the ethnic principle and the concept that state frontiers must be viable in terms of historical, economic, and military criteria and requirements.

(vi) Confusion between the principle of plural democracy and 20th century aggressive and expansionist imperialism – and, hence, the expectation that emphasis on group factors will result in imperialism and war.

(vii) The assumption that economic interdependence, which affects virtually all groups, is incompatible with political "isolationism" on a plural basis.

(viii) Overemphasis on the principle of equality which seems to imply that group differences are inconsequential and should be gradually abolished through racial and ethnic mixing, acculturation, and the replacement of minor by "major " languages; in brief, the illusion that the "abolition" of pluralism would eliminate the major cause of human strife.

(ix) The delusion that ethnic dispersal and intermingling, the latter encouraged by large-scale migrations resulting from economic changes, render self-determination obsolete, and the consequent notion that political structures based on the *inviolable* integrity of societal groups are impractical and that the communal integration of state populations is a desirable goal. This has been the case in Africa with, to put it mildly, catastrophic results.

(x) The opposition of settler states, including most states in the western hemisphere which depend on multi-national immigration, to the suggestion that group integrity should be preserved; and the belief that "melting pot arrangements" which supposedly create new nations should be actively encouraged by deliberate policies intended to promote assimilation.

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(xi) The alleged experience that the principle of self-determination destroyed multi-national structures like Austria-Hungary, which it would have been in the interest of world peace to preserve, and the uncritical rejection of the thesis that Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Tzarist Russian Empire fell apart largely because they denied the idea of ethno-separatism. To the contrary, Belgium has never been politically divided into ethnic regions, yet the Belgian political community is nowadays increasingly divided between groups that place their ethnic loyalties as Flemings and Walloons at a higher level than their loyalties to the common state. The same trends may be found in Canada, Scotland and Wales, and also among the Basques, the Corsicans, the peoples of Yugoslavia, and so many other countries.

(xii) Support of supra-national movements, such as the movement toward European federation, the related rejection even of peaceful nationalism, and the naive hope that *federative* movements can succeed without satisfactory solutions to ethnic problems. World History since 1945 contains many examples of the failure of federative solutions, in Africa, in the West Indies and in South East Asia.

(xiii) Fear on the part of multi-national states, including the U.S.S.R., the United States, India, Indonesia, and even China, that plural democracy would entail major domestic changes and possibly explosion and conflict.

Viewing all these objections, many of which arise from reasons of party politics and personal vested interests, it is small wonder that South Africa's policy of structuring a plurality of democracies encounters so much opposition. It is of major political importance that the concept of plural democracies is of the greatest potential significance for divided nations, such as Germany, China, Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Turkey, Thailand, Ireland, and some African states. Yet since unification would involve major realignments, and a consequent loss of power by dominant groups, the subject is more or less taboo.

The resistance to arguments for plural democracy is very strong and in some instances quite violent. Group oppression is still widespread, and the old habit dies hard. However, most of the arguments that are adduced against the freedom and protection of minority groups do not hold water. It may be freely admitted that pluralism creates complications, but it cannot be admitted that those complications are reduced or avoided if group problems are ignored. On the contrary, experience seems to show that complications are lessened whenever ethnic rights are recognised, while

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ethnic demands which are suppressed are likely to erupt with a vengeance.

Dispersion, intermingling, and migrations of societal groups present no reason why such groups should be left without representation. In fact, it is quite easy to grant group rights to dispersed populations through the device of cultural-personal autonomy invented in Austria around the turn of the century. A proper understanding of the principle of ethnic pluralism is imperative precisely because the trend is toward forming common markets and regional defense alliances, and perhaps larger federations. At the same time, a proper understanding of the plural factor is necessary because of the many threats to international peace that derive from unsolved minority problems.

The current emphasis in the politics of international reform is on human and civil rights as they affect individuals. In such a political environment, in which the demands of ethnic groups are suppressed, widespread alienation is inevitable. Few societies can afford this, and South Africa is not among them. The problems of South Africa are relevant to the world at large, where inter-group problems have assumed a major significance. New approaches to the handling of multinational conflicts, such as those being explored in South Africa, are urgently needed.

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ALBANIA – THE RELUCTANT PUPPET

By Julian Birch

With the Sino-Albanian alliance drawing increasingly close to a breakdown, the time is ripe for a review of external influences on Albanian domestic politics and for speculation as to the future of Albania following the expected termination of Sino-Albanian relations.

The internal politics of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania, which has been the official name used since the adoption of the new constitution in 1967, appear to the casual observer to be shrouded in a dense cloud of obscurity. Albania receives attention in the western media only in connection with its relations with the Soviet Union and China, or when changes in internal leadership are announced. Little attention is paid to Albania at other times, yet it is precisely these two circumstances which provide us, with a major theoretical dilemma, and conversely with one of the principle keys to that dilemma.

The dilemma may be stated thus: to all outward appearances Albania is a classical example of totalitarianism. Judged by criteria suggested by Friedrich and Brzezinski in the 1950s, (1) and by Schapiro in the 1970s, (2) Albania, North Korea and Kampuchea come as close as it is possible in the real world to the totalitarian model of political theory. And yet, real heads have rolled for real as well as 'politically convenient' opposition to official policies at different times and at different levels of society. If such opposition can arise, from the very highest councils in the land to the lowliest of student groups, in what sense can totalitarian control be said to have been attained? – the more so now that the firing squad is less frequently a prominent instrument of political debate.

A major key to the understanding of these internal upheavals and oppositions has been, and indeed remains, Albania's relations with the great powers and more especially with her protector and guarantor of the moment, China. In spite of its ostensibly firm committment to the 2nd world, Albania is an almost classic example of a third world regime manipulated and interfered with by external powers, but in turn using those

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same external forces to justify internal actions against the real or conveniently imaginery opponents of a leadership dedicated to retaining its position. Already, as relations with China have soured, upheavals have occurred within Albania, and a final break will most probably lead to further disputation as the leadership looks round for new allies and supporters or decides to 'go-it-alone' as far as possible.

In order to show how the current difficulties with China are likely to produce internal turmoil and to upset the normally united front that such states seek to impress upon the world at large, it is necessary to retrace the patterns of opposition and dissent of the past. In doing this, attention will focus on relations with four external forces which impinged on Albania's internal affairs to the extent of presenting some degree of challenge to the unending and seemingly absolute power of Enver Hoxha and Melmet Shehu, now respectively the heads of party and government. Although these relationships – with the Western Powers, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and China – overlap somewhat chronologically, for analytical purposes they can best be dealt with separately.

The Western Connection

With the Germans driven from the country by January 1945, the immediate opposition to the new rulers came from the inevitable quarters – the bajraktars (or headmen) and their peasant supporters among the Geg population of Northern Albania, (3) (most of the new communist leaders being southerners or Tosks), members and supporters of the former government, (4) the Catholic Church hierarchy and its support in the north of the country. (5) The prophylactic work carried out by the Special Peoples' Court in Tirane (6) following its establishment on 26 January 1945 under the control of Minister of the Interior Koçi Xoxe, showed that the regime meant business and was serious about its intention to transform the national leadership if not the country as a whole. The charge of being an enemy of the people quickly came to be applied to those who showed anything short of enthusiasm for the new provisional government. The show trials of this period did much to stabilise the situation at home and the new leadership was able to turn some of its attention to its international position. Many of the victims, such as the former Prime Minister Koço Kotta, were to perish in the worst of the labour camps, like Burrel in the north, and Vloçisht, near Korçë.

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A prey to neighbouring powers throughout her history, and lacking ethnically water-tight frontiers, little Albania still faced an uncertain future in the post-war world. Her new leaders were at once theoretically internationalists, but at the same time patriots who had played a major part in liberating their own country from the German occupation forces. Protection or guarantees of her position were desirable, particularly from countries which could provide the economic assistance to wrench her out of the feudal era in line with the new leaderships' aspirations: but how to achieve this without creating a position of dependence and vulnerability was the central pre-occupation of Albanian foreign policy. How could aid and assistance be restrained and limited to non-interference in her internal affairs? The fact of the matter was that it could not be done entirely. Aid was, and is, seldom without strings attached, and since 1945 Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha has shown an unwillingness to strangle Albania's separate identity with those very strings, by choosing, whenever possible, allies who were sufficiently remote from Albania to be unlikely to intervene directly. Nevertheless, the lack of self sufficiency and the presence of those who would side with the protecting power, has, time and again, proved to be an Achilles heal which has frequently threatened Hoxha and his head of government Mehmet Shehu.

In the light of these considerations, and in spite of their Marxist orientation, Hoxha and a number of his supporters in the party leadership were by no means averse to seeking, from the outset, ties with the major western powers, Britain and the United States in particular. Hoxha himself had been educated in a French school in Albania and at Montpellier University in France, while his colleague Shehu had attended an American school in Tirane and a military academy in Naples. Both were then, by background, outward-looking intellectuals, and the wartime assistance given to the Albanian partisans by the Western allies (7) left a further debt of gratitude. Indeed, Hoxha, in his now well-known report to the Congress of Youth, in April 1945, was positively eulogistic about the "great democracies" Britain and the U.S.A., their war efforts, Churchill's "rare ability as a leader," and Roosevelt "one of the true defenders of democracy and freedom." (8)

His overtures were met with some positive response when, by the end of spring 1945, both the U.S.A and Britain had representatives in Albania. (9) However, this rapproachment was not to be the order of the day. The western allies made it clear through their Tirane representatives, on 10

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November 1945, that diplomatic recognition would be conditional on her holding free and open, democratic elections at an early date. After the elections, on 2 December, other conditions were again pressed on her respecting obligations entered into in pre-war treaties, while Western support for Greek claims to southern Albania and efforts to keep her out of the U.N. and the Paris peace conference further soured relations. Western lack of trust in Hoxha's statements, doubts about the degree of freedom in the elections, dismissal of Albania as a mere dependency of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the growing cold war atmosphere between the two blocs all conspired to create a breakdown well before the sinking of the British destroyers in the Corfu incident of October 1946.

The western delegations in Tiranë had already departed by then, and diplomatic relations were effectively broken with Britain by April 1946 and with the United States by the following November. (10)

However, it is not the purpose here to judge if this breakdown was the result of a misunderstanding of Hoxha's overtures, or of a more deep-rooted unwillingness to understand him, but rather to look at the results of this breakdown in terms of the internal opposition which it generated.

After they did not obtain the guarantees they sought, Britain and America were determined to destroy Soviet-style totalitarian socialism in Eastern Europe by smashing it at its weakest links. As part of the wider program of rolling back Soviet imperialism, including, as it did, support for guerrilla groups in the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, Albania was chosen as the primary target for such an operation among the satellite states. She was judged to be particularly vulnerable and was to be the start of a domino theory in reverse. If Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor had temporarily contained dissent internally through the activities of the Special People's Court, then it had to be stimulated, given a new injection of life and sustained from without.

Albanian accounts indicate that this process had begun even before the departure of the Military Missions in 1946, (11) and that these agencies had followed in the time honoured tradition of being euphemisms for field intelligence stations. Early in 1946, the Albanians imposed restrictions on the movements of the personnel of these missions, clearly suspecting their involvement with anti-communist opposition groups.

As early as 29 June, 1946, the probable results of these activities began to show themselves with the trial, before the Supreme Military Court in Tiranë, of a number of the regime's opponents. The charges against the 37

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accused were supported by the already obligatory confessions, and involved treason on behalf of nationalist leaders such as Fiqri Dine and Muharrem Bairakhtar, preparation of a coup with foreign help and the plotting of the assassination of political leaders including Hoxha. The foreign help was said quite specifically to have come from members of the British Military Mission in Tiranë, primarily from Lieut. Col. Palmer and Maj. Arnold. (12) Nine of the accused received the death penalty, the others from 20 years to life imprisonment, and two were acquitted. (13)

With the withdrawal of the mission from Tiranë, support for the regime's opponents and operations of this type had to be directed and controlled from outside the country from 1947 onwards.

The support now offered took on a more militant aspect, with armed guerrilla groups complementing the more conventional intelligence gathering missions. This new development was a joint American CIA – British SIS venture and was to be carried out on a considerable scale up until 1952.

The CIA, after initially seeking to use the emigré Albanian National Committee, which it sponsored, as the source of recruits for these missions, agreed to use the followers of Abbas Kupi, a Geg tribal chieftain and monarchist, who had been smuggled into Albania by the British in 1941, had been a leading figure in the National Liberation Movement from 1942 to 1943, and subsequently headed the Legality partisan organisation. Kupi was the SIS choice, and had their active support through the Committee of Free Albanians.

Many of the would-be liberators of their country were recruited from among Albanians in Displaced Persons camps in Italy, and were taken for training to Fort Bingemma in Malta, Cyprus, West Germany, and elsewhere. Thereafter, a succession of groups were sent into Albania to organise and mobilise the opposition, judged by the SIS/CIA co-ordinators to be widespread enough to offer some chance of success in the economically weak and politically untried People's Republic. They were variously smuggled across the border from Greece, landed on the coast by a fast motor cruiser operating out of Dassia Bay in Corfu or from submarines; and parachuted into the Albanian mountains by American aircraft flying from Whelus Field in Libya and bases in Italy. The actual pattern of these events remains somewhat confusing and can only be roughly pieced together from diverse sources at present.

Results of the various operations were quick to emerge, but not quite as expected in the West. Already in July (14) and September, (15) 1947,

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trials of regime opponents took place inside Albania at which the charges concerned armed uprisings which were receiving the support of Britain and the United States. Death sentences were again imposed.

In January 1948, another seven members of 'secret' associations, including four former deputies in the legislature, received death penalties following charges of seeking to restore ex-King Zog, again with external assistance. (16)

In the autumn of 1949 an Albanian National Assembly deputy was reported to have been killed by a guerrilla band in the North of the country, and shortly after, a military tribunal in Shkoder sentenced two 'saboteurs' to death and others to imprisonment. (17)

The sorry one-way procession of aborted missions continued however, with Operation Valuable in December 1949, when 36 guerrillas, in 6 separate parties, were landed opposite Corfu, never to be heard from again, save for one survivor who escaped to Greece. (18)

In any event, Hoxha's announcement to a rally of party workers on 29 April, 1950, that rebel invaders had been engaged and killed, captured or driven off, was followed by the announcement, in June of death sentences passed on other agents apparently parachuted in from Italy. (19)

A death sentence and various terms of imprisonment were imposed upon a further group of agents on 29 November 1950. (20).

In January 1951, a larger-scale infiltration by parachute and submarine was reported by the Minister of the Interior, (21) in which 29 were killed in resisting capture. Some 14 other infiltrators, trained, it was claimed, in West Germany were brought to trial in Tiranë in October 1951, (22) and charged with attempting to overthrow the government by force. Two were sentenced to death, and the others imprisoned for from seven years to life.

That same month, another two groups of twenty agents, who had parachuted in, were all said to have been killed, except for one, on resisting arrest. 33 others were stated to have been 'rendered harmless' by death in battle or capture. (23)

The last of these western attempts to stir up opposition from outside occurred shortly before Easter in 1952. The twelve agents parachuted into the Elbasan area of central Albania included Hamit Matjani, a wartime resistance leader, as well as Captain Nalil Sufa and Captain Zenel Shehu, members of King Zog's Royal Guard. The result was yet another ambush by the Albanian security forces in which five guerrillas were apparently

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killed immediately. The other seven were quickly brought to trial and all were executed. (24)

That welcoming parties from the Albanian Ministry of the Interior attended most, if not all, of these unannounced arrivals was clearly not unconnected with the fact that Kim Philby was one of the four members of the SIS/CIA co-ordinating committee in overall charge of these operations. Consequently, no serious test of the real or potential opposition within Albanian society at large occurred. Albania was, however, largely abandoned thereafter by the Western power, (25) and left to the machinations of other nations who wished to ensure that she developed within carefully prescribed parameters. Dissent among the population was now to take a back seat to opposition inside the new ruling party.

The Yugoslav Connection

The Yugoslavs had been intimately involved in the very creation of the Albanian Communist Party and it was clear that this involvement would not cease once that party had attained power. Indeed, Albania's liberation from Italian and German control seemed almost to invite Yugoslav attempts to fill the vacuum. It was not long before such involvement became apparent through the emergence of opposition within the new elite.

An early purification of the ranks between November 1945 and June 1946, resulting in the expulsion of 1,246 persons or 10% of the membership, had done much to eliminate opportunist elements within the ruling party itself. However, this did little or nothing to resolve the problem of Albania's position with respect to the world outside. Two principle views existed within the party. A moderate group, composed primarily of intellectuals and bureaucratic officials and centered around Sejfulla Maleshova of the Ministry of Education, urged a policy of gradual development, but more significantly in this context, they wanted an independent course in foreign affairs, retaining friendship with both East and West.

These views were opposed to those of a more militant group in the party, many of working-class origin, who had as their spokesman Minister of the Interior Koçi Xoxe – himself of impecable proletarian background and now well on the way to becoming for a time the most powerful figure in the land. They were supported in the background by the Yugoslavs who had no desire to see some kind of neutralised Albania. Xoxe, using his

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position as Minister of the Interior and backed by the decisions of the 4th Party Central Committee Plenum of November 1945 (which initiated the drive against 'opportunists'), started to weed out those intellectuals suspected of advocating moderate or anti-Yugoslav views, and, by the time the clash of views finally occurred at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on 21 February 1946, the pro-Yugoslav clique around Xoxe was in the ascendant. Maleshova was expelled from the Politburo and the Central Committee for espousing allegedly right-wing views on foreign and domestic policy. (26)

This was to be one of the few instances of external involvement on the side of the prevailing view within the party rather than one wherein a direct challenge was mounted against the leadership group. Whilte Hoxha may have been sympathetic to the views of the moderates at first, he finally threw in this lot with the pro-Yugoslav group in December 1945. (27)

Xoxe and the pro-Yugoslav clique were now in a very strong position indeed, and ensured adherence to the Moscow/Belgrade policy line. Xoxe's strength lay not only in his control of the Ministry of the Interior – and hence the Sigurimi or secret Police – but also in his role as Party Organisational Secretary, giving him a very powerful voice in internal party matters. And yet it was this very position of strength which ultimately produced an equally dramatic downfall for the pro-Yugoslav group. The Yugoslavs themselves, emboldened by their success in retaining a powerful influence over the direction of Albanian policy, began to push further towards Yugoslav-Albanian union, initially by closely integrating the economies. A clash of interests soon appeared. To Hoxha and some of his colleagues, Yugoslav aid was seen as a guarantee of its newly regained independence. To the Yugoslavs it was a means of making her dependent. During 1947, Albanian leaders even alleged that Yugoslav technicians were committing sabotage to undermine the Albanian government and open the way for alternative leaders more directly under Yugoslav control. (28)

Once again Xoxe moved against those who were hostile to the pro-Yugoslav line, announcing on 20 May, 1947, the arrest, trial, and conviction, on grounds of anti-state plotting, of nine members of the Peoples' Assembly. They included Boshnjaku, director of the State Bank and long a party member. Maleshova was removed from the Ministry of Education. (29)

Hoxha, now clearly under a growing threat, and being accused directly by Belgrade of fostering anti-Yugoslav sentiments in Albania, began to fight

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back. Yugoslav attempts to interfere in Albanian internal affairs were denounced by the Politburo, in spite of the opposition of Xoxe and his main supporter Pandi Kristo. (30) During 1947, Hoxha, Nako Spiru and others increasingly looked towards the Soviet Union as an alternative, more distant, source of support. Xoxe however was by no means finished, and continued his work for the Yugoslav cause, assisting in intimidating Spiru until he committed suicide in November 1947; (31) threatening to disrupt the signing of a pact with Bulgaria unless Yugoslavia continued to be recognised as having a privileged position vis-à-vis Albania; and openly condemning the failings in the Albanian relationship with Yugoslavia. With the assistance of a Yugoslav special envoy, Savo Zllatić, Xoxe was able to gain a Pyrrhic victory when his line prevailed at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in February-March 1948. Again, he seized this opportunity to have prominent opponents of the pro-Yugoslav line expelled from the party, among them Liri Belishova, the widow of Nako Spiru (her first husband), Dr. Ymer Dishnica, another of the moderate intellectuals, and the hapless Maleshova. (32) Mehmet Shehu, the Head of the General Staff was also dropped as a Candidate Member of the Central Committee and removed from his post. Xoxe's proposal to merge the Albanian and Yugoslav economies and armed forces was then approved. (33) The Yugoslav trojan horse seemed to have won the day, and the way was open for Xoxe's further backroom maneuverings to result in a purge of all remaining anti-Yugoslav elements, including Hoxha himself.

However, he overstepped the mark with his suggestion to the Politburo, in April 1948, that Albania apply for admission to the Yugoslav federal state. He failed, and his subsequent efforts to hold on to the reins of power by prophylactic measures were thwarted by yet more external forces.

The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute began to worsen dramatically and Albania could hardly remain entirely neutral. Hoxha openly espoused an anti-Yugoslav line leading to an outright breakdown of relations, and, by September 1948, was able to regain control in a dramatic about-turn, which even had Xoxe taking the newly fashionable line. (34) The previously dominant Yugoslav lobby now found itself on the brink of being branded as enemies of the people.

At the eleventh plenum in September 1948, the decisions of the eighth plenum were reversed, and Belishova, Shehu and others purged by Xoxe were restored to their former posts. At first Xoxe himself lost only his party post, (35) but this was merely the beginning. On the 3rd October,

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1948, he lost the Ministry of the Interior (being transferred to Industry instead). Although his associate Nesti Kerenexhi was given control of the Interior Ministry, it was only a temporary measure to allay suspicion, for on the last day of October both were shorn of their government posts. (36) The axe finally fell at the Party Congress which opened a week later, where Hoxha and Xoxe and Kristo (the former head of the Party Control Commission) expelled from the Party. Shortly after, Xoxe, along with Kristo and other members of the Yugoslav faction and supporters in the Ministry of the Interior were arrested. (37) Stalin had apparently given this move his blessing. (38)

Xoxe was tried in secret in May 1945, (39) and confessed to forming an opposition group within the party and collaborating directly with the Yugoslavs. Declared guilty he faced the firingsquad on 11 June, 1949. (40) Kristo was rather more fortunate, being sentenced to 20 years in prison, and others in their group were similarly immobilised. (41)

Even allowing for exaggerations in the documentary record, this appears to have been a clear instance of direct Yugoslav involvement in Albanian domestic politics, not merely in support of an opposition group, but directing what was for some time the leading faction in the party, in opposition to the national interest as perceived by Hoxha, Spiru, Shehu and others.

This was one of the first, but by no means the last, instances of Yugoslav intervention. However, they too were compelled to exercise their influence at arms length as the two countries entered into a cold war of their own.

In order to forestall the impact of the Yugoslav fifth column, a considerable purge was set in progress by Hoxha and the pro-Soviet faction over the following 2-3 years. Direct Soviet involvement in this process was not readily apparent, but the results must have met with their favour.

Doubtless Hoxha himself was also using this opportunity to remove other real or potential sources of challenge to his own authority. Indeed, at the third plenum of the Party Central Committee in October 1949, he actually criticised the security police for alleged inefficiency, and the judiciary for excessive leniency. (42)

The Yugoslavs seem to have used the split as an opportunity to join in the general melee of infiltrating agents which was now taking place from all around Albania. A trial at Korce in the South in December 1950, produced two death and heavy-prison sentences for five agents accused of entering from Greece and Yugoslavia. (43) A further trial of twelve Yugoslav agents at Kukes added another two death sentences to the already

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impressive tally. (44)

The purge then quickly moved into higher gear and soon hit at the top echelons of the Albanian leadership when, in April 1950, a Party Conference ratified a Central Committee decision recommending the removal of Abedin Shehu, the Minister of Industry, and Niazi Islami, the Deputy Minister of Communications, for anti-party and anti-Soviet activities. Shehu also lost his Central Committee membership, and alleged supporters of his in the army, Nexhip Vinçani and Gjin Marku, also lost their military posts. (45)

A number of allegedly pro-Yugoslav groups were subsequently tried in several Albanian towns and cities, but even this was not felt to be sufficient. Another thorough review of all party members was put in motion in the summer of 1950. This exchange of party membership cards resulted in the expulsion of 4,000 people, or 8 per cent of the party. (46)

Cabinet reshuffles continued to take place throughout 1950-1 but the sources of unrest and Yugoslav involvement in them, were not eradicated.

A bomb explosion at the Soviet legation in Tiranë in February 1951 led to the arrest of a number of people, including Sabiha Kasimati, a professor of biology, and Manush Peshkepia, a writer. Members of this group were condemned to death and executed. (47) Whether this was some kind of Reichstag fire type of incident or not, the explosion, together with clashes on the Yugoslav frontier, provided a suitable context for a move against those who were less than enthusiastic about Hoxha's industrialisation policies and purges on non-Titoists. Party Organisational Secretary, and former carpenter, Tuk Jakova, the head of the Cadres Directory Teodor Heba, Minister of Justice Manol Konomi, and the party secretaries of the Tiranë, Elbasan and Vlorë districts all lost their jobs, with Jakova consequently being dropped from the Politburo but not from the Central Committee. Konomi and Heba however were expelled from the Central Committee. (48)

The effects of the whole range of purges of pro-Yugoslavs and moderates were revealed at the Party's Second Congress in March-April 1952. Five of the twenty-one members of the Party's Central Committee elected in 1948 had been removed. Hoxha also revealed that the purge had bitten equally deep into the lower ranks of the party, with 12,000, or a quarter of the total membership being removed between November 1948 and December 1951. (49)

The Yugoslavs had not given up their aim of stirring up opposition to the Hoxha regime, and had, in the meantime, held a conference of Albanian

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exiles in Prizren in May 1951, at which a call was made upon the Albanian people to rise up directly against their government. (50)

The February 1953 treaty between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia was also viewed by the Albanians as a sign that the Yugoslavs had not relinquished their goals now that their principal adherents in Albania had been eliminated.

With the death of Stalin, and growing rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by 1955, the pressure against Hoxha's Stalinist Leadership group grew – this time uniting pro-Soviet reformist and pro-Yugoslav elements. This curious new alliance gambled on an apparently auspicious conjunction of circumstances, but lost. Tuk Jakova (a former accuser of Xoxe) and Bedri Spahiu, the Minister of Education, are alleged, by the Albanians, to have mounted the main challenge, but the Central Committee session of April 1955 resulted only in their being relieved of official duties. (51) The charges against them essentially involved being pro-Yugoslav, but were not made explicit probably in order not to disrupt relations with Soviets, now themselves moving closer to the Yugoslavs. If indeed this was an early bid for power in the heady post-Stalin days it failed, and served as a warning to others who might be similarly tempted.

Nevertheless, Hoxha still had to reckon with his ostensible ally Khrushchev, who was about to unleash a wave of unrest on Eastern Europe with his denunciation of Stalin and more importantly, Stalinism. Not only was Stalin held up as a father figure in Albania but his style of rule was much favoured by the hard-pressed Albanian leadership. The dramatic change in the Soviet position percolated through to Albania as it did to the other satellites and seems to have stimulated a number of spontaneous reactions and demands for change among the population. (52) However, a major challenge to Hoxha and Shehu came from within the elite itself, with the active support of the Yugoslavs (and probably the tacit support of the Soviets) who again sought to use this opportunity to bring Albania back into line – their line.

Again the pattern of events is far from clear and can still only be surmised from subsequent actions taken against those said to have been involved. (53) The principal 'plotters' were apparently Tuk Jakova, who, as we have seen, was claimed to be pro-Yugoslav in the previous year; General Panajot Plaku, almost certainly both pro-Yugoslav and pro-Soviet; Dali Ndreu, a wartime partisan commander and former Politburo member; and the latter's wife, Liri Gega, also a former Politburo member, who may well

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have been pro-Soviet but with little sympathy for the Yugoslavs.

The main challenge to Hoxha seems to have come at the city party conference in Tiranë in April 1956, (54) at which a number of accusations were made against him, his Stalinist methods and style of leadership, and a call made to rehabilitate previous purge victims. A failure to achieve a real rapprochement with Yugoslavia was significantly said to have been another of the charges levelled.

Hoxha seems to have proved a match for his pro-Yugoslav opponents and was able to resist the challenge successfully. Indeed, shortly afterwards, far from seeking to accommodate some of the demands, he moved onto the offensive to destroy his opponents, severely disciplining those who had spoken against him with expulsions, imprisonments and perhaps worse.

At a Central Committee session 10-11 May, 1956, his actions were discussed (55) and the subsequent Third Congress of the Party, later the same month, endorsed the purges of Jakova and Spahiu. However, the harshest treatment was reserved for Ndreu and Gega. They were said by Hoxha, in 1960, to have been caught trying to flee to Yugoslavia. (56)
Along with Petar Bulatović (a Yugoslav citizen and former leader of a wartime Albanian partisan brigade), Ndreu and Gega were charged with espionage for an unnamed country and shot in Tiranë on 23 November 1956 – Gega being pregnant at the time, according to Khrushchev. (57)

General Plaku, a victim of the 1948 purge but Deputy Minister of Defence by the mid-1950s, has declared that he complained about Hoxha first to the Soviets, then to the Yugoslavs, in the course of 1957, (58) before voting with his feet by defecting to Yugoslavia in May 1957. (59) His defection was followed by the arrest of not only his family, but also of a supporter in the Ministry of Defence, Miyslin Peza, the deputy chief of staff, who was also charged with aiding Plaku's flight. (60) Although it was said at the time that Plaku had had a dispute with a Soviet official before defecting and had disapproved of the dominance of Soviet specialists, (61) Hoxha, at the Moscow Communist Conference of 1960, accused him of having sought Khrushchev's support in liquidating the Albanian leadership and of having been offered asylum in the Soviet Union. (62) However, Plaku remained in Yugoslavia until his death in Belgrade in July 1966.

The Yugoslavs had thus been largely unsuccessful in exploiting the turmoil of 1956, at least in its Albanian dimension. The conflict, however, continued to simmer on a propaganda level. Following one of Hoxha's verbal attacks in 1961, the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* summarised the

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effects of the Albanian purges of real or imaginary enemies up to that point. It revealed that of the 14 Central Committee members elected at the Party's foundation in 1941, only Hoxha was still alive, that 14 of the 31 Central Committee members of 1944 had been liquidated, leaving only 9 in office, and that of the 109 members of the original National Assembly, 17 had been shot, 15 been imprisoned, 2 had committed suicide and only 29 remained politically active. (63)

The endless round of uncovering Yugoslav spies continued with a trial and conviction of sixteen of them at Shkoder, in Northern Albania in May 1959. (64)

Yugoslav involvement may well have occurred in two subsequent cases in 1960 and 1961, but these will be dealt with more fully when considering Soviet intervention. The Yugoslavs, however, continued to be a convenient and sometimes genuine external enemy to explain away internal difficulties, and a group of 'American and Yugoslav spies' who had infiltrated by parachute, were to be condemned in June 1963, indeed an official report of 1970 claimed that between 1945 and 1969, the Albanian frontier troops had dealt with 340 groups of Greek and Yugoslav agents, killing 148 and capturing 3,600. (65)

However, the major enemy from 1956 had increasingly become Khrushchev's revisionist Soviet Union, which, although more distant, threatened to become just as much of a challenge to the Albanian leaders' at home.

The Soviet Connection

The early history of Soviet intervention in Albania's politics, and particularly in her personnel policies, is difficult to trace. Her early links were well hidden, but the experience of the other sattelites indicates that the KGB residency in the Embassy is seldom any more inactive if the host nation is an ally than if it is the declared enemy. With Albania towing the anti-Yugoslav line, little effort may have been required, but the growing Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement from 1955 necessitated more active measures. As has been indicated, a number of those implicated in the attempts to dislodge Hoxha in 1955-56 may well have sought Soviet support or even had Soviet encouragement. General Plaku and Liri Gega may probably be counted among the pro-Soviet elements of that time (66) — Gega, in particular, being spoken of very sympathetically by Khrushchev in

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1961. (67)

Hoxha's use of brute force against his opponents quickly neutralised any Soviet attempts to oust him, and Soviet pressure at the 3rd Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour, through the agency of Mikhail Suslov and Pyotr Pospelov, failed to obtain a reversal of Albania's internal policies by way of rehabilitation for Koçi Xoxe. (68) Hoxha's increasingly anti-Soviet position intensified the clash over the next few years, but it remained largely at the level of polemics.

It was not to be until 1960 that a further serious Soviet-backed opposition surfaced into the light of day, once again at the highest levels of the party and government hierarchy.

On this occasion it took the form of what appears to have been a direct attempt at organising a coup against the Albanian leadership, in the form of an armed uprising by disaffected elements, particularly among the military. Reversal of Hoxha's policies may no longer have been viewed as sufficient. Certainly the military were to prove the only effective challenge to the leadership of the one party states of much of the third world throughout the 1960s and the Soviets were not slow to appreciate possibilities of such an approach. It is possible that there was some Yugoslav involvement here as well, but the Soviet embassy seems to have been the centre of operations, attempting "to detach the leadership from its party and to turn the army cadres and other cadres which had studied in the Soviet Union against it", according to the Albanians at a later date. (69) The plot seems to have been intended to hatch in the autumn, before the Fourth Congress of the APL scheduled for November 1960. However, the Sigurimi discovered what was about to happen and the plotters were arrested during the July of that year. (70) The group included Rear Admiral and former C-in-C to the Albanian Navy, Teme Sejku; former chairman of the Elbasan district party committee and Albanian representative at Comecon, Tahir Demi; ex-officer Hajri Mane; Avdul Resuli an official; Jonuz Puriz and five others. (71) Sejku had been trained in the Soviet Union, had been there in 1947-9 and again in 1956-8, and had obviously had contacts with commanders at the Soviet naval base at Sarzan in Albania as a consequence of his official position. In the same way Demi had had close links with Soviet officials in the economic sphere. However, when their trial opened in a Tiranë cinema on 15 May, 1961, the charges were somewhat strange. Sejku was charged with having worked to overthrow the regime in Albania since 1951, with having set up a spy network in the main cities and towns, and, after unsuccessfully attempt-

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ing to remove Hoxha at the 1956 Congress, with plotting an armed insurrection for August and September 1960, in which aid was to come from Albanian exiles, Yugoslav and Greek troops, as well as the US 6th Fleet. (72) A Yugoslav connection was pointed to when General Plaku, the 1957 defector to Yugoslavia, was referred to, in Piruz's confession, as one of the conspirators in meetings which had taken place on Greek territory. Yugoslavia was certainly being unveiled as the principal culprit, but she was now Moscow's ally and Moscow as yet was rarely attacked openly. Significantly, the trial was also ignored by the Soviet press. (73)

All the defendants confessed their involvement in the 'revisionist, imperialist plot', and Sejku, Demi, Mane and Resuli were sentenced to death on 28 May, and shot three days later. The remaining defendants received prison terms ranging from 15 to 25 years.

Whether or not they were directly involved in the plot, or even knew of it, a pro-Soviet position was endorsed at the highest levels by Politburo member and Party Secretary Liri Belishova, whose pro-Soviet statements at the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on 6 June, 1960, were excised from the version of her speech published in the Albanian press. (74) Belishova was not alone, but was supported by Koço Tashko, a veteran communist and Chairman of the Central Auditing Committee of the Party, and most probably by the Soviet Embassy in Tiranë. Together, they sought to prevent the growing pro-Chinese position of the Albanian party from developing to fruition and to return the regime to the pro-Soviet camp. According to Khrushchev, who was away from Moscow at the time, Belishova had a meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and Frol Kozlov during a stopover in Moscow on the way back from Peking. In the course of this meeting, she told the Soviets about the Sino-Albanian negotiations, and Chinese statements about the Soviets. (75)

What quite happened as a result is still obscured by contradictory claims. It seems that Belishova was purged from the Party, and possibly arrested in August or early September 1960 (76) for 'grave errors' with respect to the party line. Tashko was removed from the party for 'hostile' actions but whether he was arrested or not is unclear. (77) Belishova's second husband, Maqo Como, the Minister of Agriculture, was also purged at roughly the same time, or a little later, (78) and failed to gain re-election to the Central Committee at the February 1961 Party Congress.

At the international Communist Conference in Moscow on 16 November, 1960, Hoxha said of Belishova that she had "capitulated to the

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dishonest threats of the Soviet Union". (79) Khrushchev acknowledged a Soviet link when, at the Soviet Party's 22nd Congress in October 1961, he claimed that Belishova and Tashko had merely "had the courage honestly and openly to voice their disagreement with the policy of the Albanian leaders and took a stand for Albanian solidarity with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries". (80) Khrushchev's speech, however, contained a more or less direct call for the overthrow of Hoxha and Shehu. Hoxha later went further, to claim that Belishova and Tashko were involved in the actual attempt to overthrow the Albanian leadership. (81) However, it has also been claimed that just before her arrest, Belishova accepted the new pro-Chinese view of the leadership, (82) in a move not unlike that of Xoxe in 1948. Certainly no trial was reported and the case faded from view. Whether Belishova and Tashko were directly involved or not mattered little; the plot provided Hoxha with an opportune justification for the removal of the remnants of Soviet influence in the leadership group.

Nevertheless, the Albanians went on to claim that the Soviet Union infiltrated hundreds of agents between 1961 and 1970 in a concentrated campaign of subversion. (83)

However, any other high-ranking officials who may have harboured pro-Soviet, or less than enthusiastically pro-Chinese, views were very soon to be caught up in the personnel reshuffles in Albania's own cultural revolution from 1966-69, (84) though even this may not have entirely eliminated Soviet inspired opposition. It is unclear whether this was the motive for the expulsion of 30 students from Tiranë University for "pursuit of a revisionist line outside the confines of Marxism-Leninism", as reported in the Italian communist press in July 1969. (85)

Any direct Soviet involvement in the subsequent 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 purges (respectively of high ranking cultural, military and economic officials) is equally uncertain. The only hint of it came in the case of the military leadership, decimated in July 1975. (86) Among the eight leading military and politico military figures dismissed from office were Gen. Beqir Balluku (a Politburo member since 1948 and Minister of Defence from 1953), Petrit Dume (a candidate Politburo member from 1961 and Chief of the Army General Staff) and Hito Cako. (87) This was a move of a magnitude almost equalling the dismissal of Xoxe in 1948, except that Balluku had always been thought of as being in very close harmony with Hoxha and Shehu, his old colleagues in the wartime partisans. Indeed it was Khrushchev who, in his memoirs, said of them that, "They had a sort of troika ... Enver

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Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu would sentence the accused to death, and Balluku would personally carry out the execution". (88) Had Balluku simply grown tired of standing in the wings while Hoxha and Shehu postured on the world stage? Did he simply make a challenge for power before it was too late for him to be a serious contender for the leadership race likely to follow the demise of the ageing Hoxha? And if so, were other external forces supporting or making use of his ambition to topple the existing leaders. Hoxha (no doubt shaken if there was a plot) indicated as much in two remarkable speeches in April and November 1976. In the first of these, at a meeting with steelworkers from Elbasan on 30 April, he spoke of "internal enemies and traitors" who "wanted to see a deterioration of our friendship with our sister China and with the Communist Party of Mao Tse Tung, and to bind our country to the Soviet revisionists". (89) Later in the year, and following a call in the Party's theoretical monthly "to face, expose and destroy, under the party's leadership, the diversionary, conspiratory and sabotaging activity of internal enemies, " (90) Hoxha returned to the issue in his 13½ hour address to the 7th Party Congress. On this occasion he was no more specific and even dropped the references to a Soviet link, merely indicting "certain revisionist countries". Indeed, the foreign element in the plot was indicated as being almost subsidiary rather than the inspiration or guiding force, when Hoxha declared: "The reasonable group of Beqir Balluku, Petrit Drume, and Hito Cako formed a faction at the head of the armed forces, a group that planned to overthrow the Albanian Central Committee by an armed coup in order to destroy the Albanian Workers'Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. To bring this about they intended to rely on foreign military intervention."

What happened to the conspirators after their removal from office is unclear, though rumours had Balluku, at least, executed in September or November 1974. (91)

If indeed the Soviets were involved with this group, however indirectly, it demonstrated that previous failures to overthrow Hoxha, or prevent the move towards China, heralded no decline of Soviet interest in the Balkan backwater. Nevertheless, before long, the Chinese involvement began to sour of its own accord, and the Soviets were able to watch from the sidelines with obvious pleasure. Further involvement to stir up the already murky waters can certainly be anticipated.

The Chinese Connection

At first sight, the Albanian alliance with China, which developed from

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1960 onwards, was a marriage of incompatibles brought on essentially by mutual convenience. Indeed, it may well have come as something of a surprise to the Chinese themselves that the Albanians should look so far east for a new guarantor and source of economic support. However, as underdeveloped peasant countries with a long tradition of foreign domination, China and Albania had as much in common as many allies of the past and present. Having cut herself off from the West, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Albania was now extremely isolated, and an ally like China had much to recommend it. Certainly Chinese involvement in Albanian affairs had no mischievous tradition unlike that of Albania's only potential eastern bloc partners. This was a pattern which was to prevail until very recently, and any Chinese connection with opposition seems to have been negative, in the sense that, far from inspiring opposition, China was the target of it. This became apparent in the course of the widespread purges of non-military, party and government officials from 1973 to 1976.

In the absence of detailed official explanations for these developments, speculation ran rife. A wide range of specific explanations within the anti-Chinese framework were elicited from western commentators.

Clearly, in view of the number of leading figures removed from office (three of the 13 Politburo members elected in 1971, one candidate Politburo member, and eight of the 18 members of the government (92) no sudden conversion to the Soviet line could have occurred. Indeed, a number of those dismissed had risen to high office in the 1960s – the very period of most intense anti-Soviet developments in Albania. Other explanations clearly had to be sought.

The hardy perennial of an explanation in terms of a power struggle for the succession in Hoxha's last years also raised its head, but with little conviction. (93) With the possible exception of the Balluku case, where it just may have risen as a factor, such an approach would indicate that the Sigurimi had allowed the threat to grow to quite alarming proportions before it was tackled. The Minister of the Interior, and hence political head of the secret police, could well have become the next victim of the purge as a consequence of such a failure. Like North Korea's Kim Il Sung, the Albanian leaders have learned the merits of keeping the post of security chief well within the family, in this case with Prime Minister Shehu's brother-in-law, Kadri Hasbiu.

The idea of generational conflict was also much mooted, with the new replacement leaders, often quite young and perhaps still imbued with

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idealism and revolutionary zeal, being seen as a tool of Hoxha and Shehu to ensure the continuance of revolutionary purity and enthusiasm, rather as in the Cultural Revolution in China. This had something to commend it, for a state of 'permanent revolution' seemed to have been created in Albania after 1966. At first, in 1966-7, the number of ministries had been reduced, some 15,000 bureaucrats released from their jobs and many top officials sent out to work in the provinces, (94) encouraged by the Workers' Control Groups – the Albanian Red Guards. After the bureaucracy had begun to grow again, (95) here it seemed was a repeat performance with perhaps as many again being removed from their posts at all levels, (96) and fresh regulations making it binding on all officials to spend a month each year in a production or farm job. (97) Although so many high-ranking figures were removed as a consequence, the innermost clique of Hoxha, Shehu, Hysni Kapo, Kadri Hasbiu, and their wives, remained unscathed. Again the parallels with China were obvious. Control of the movement clearly came from the very top. Moreover, in March 1973, Hoxha specifically voiced his belief that alien forces were looking to the eventual demise of the old leaders as an opportunity to produce a change of Albania's revolutionary line. (98)

Speculation suggested disagreement over foreign policy as another motive for the purge, wherein a number of the casualties had apparently sought an abandonment of Albania's isolation in Europe, and perhaps called for the leadership to look to other sources of aid, trade and contacts now that China was in turmoil and herself increasingly opening up contacts in the west. (99). Later developments in relations with China, and the continuing ascendancy of Hoxha's 'go-it-alone' policy have indicated that this was indeed a time of some indecision in the Albanian leadership, but definite proof of the primacy of this issue is still lacking.

The search for scapegoats for economic difficulties and inefficiency was also proposed by some commentors, and although such a role for some of those purged could not be entirely excluded, it could not apply to the cultural and military leaders. However, as an approach it did raise the question of economic issues which clearly could have involved many of those removed, since a single, all-embracing, explanation was not necessarily at the root of the changes, which, after all, took place over a four year period. Among the areas of possible disagreement on economic issues, the most obvious likelihood was the new sixth Five Year Plan (1976-80), the draft of which was only published in July 1976, (100) that is six months after the start of the planning period. Although such a delay was by no means

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unusual in Eastern Europe, it indicated that some issues had not been resolved on time. However, the precise nature of the disagreement, if such there were, produced no agreement among the various commentators. The purge victims had either sought to bolster the consumer sector by shifting some emphasis from heavy industry: or they had done precisely the opposite, being good Stalinists, by seeking to move resources from agriculture and consumer goods to the heavy industry sector, in view of the supposed slowdown of Chinese aid. The plan, when published, in fact revealed a concentration of resources on heavy industry and agriculture. The foreign trade officials, however, may well have been removed in part for paying inadequate attention to the party's line on self-sufficiency.

In overall reference to those dismissed, Hoxha himself spoke of the "internal and external class enemy" having reared its head. (101) Indeed, if there was a common thread to all or most of these purges it seemed to be in the nature of a general lack of enthusiasm for the exclusively China oriented outlook of Albania, and particularly its more extreme manifestations in the cultural revolution, on the part of those who fell victims. Many seem to have been disturbed by the excess to which a strict adherence to the Chinese model was leading their country. In effect an Albanian nationalist, or self-interest, response appears to have been evoked, though whether with some support from the Soviets or Yugoslavs is far from clear.

Nevertheless, whichever was the primary cause, Hoxha opened the deviationist hunting season with an attack on the rise of bourgeois – liberal tendencies and attempts to undermine Albanian revolutionary aspirations and vigour from within, in his speech of March 1973 and again at a Central Committee plenum in June 1973. (102)

Initially the axe fell on youth-leaders and ideological-cultural officials in mid-1973. (103) At the highest levels, Party Central Committee member, Chairman of the Peoples' Assembly, and Propaganda Secretary of the Tiranë District Party Committee Fadil Pacrami, as well as fellow Central Committee and Director of the Albanian Broadcasting Service, Todi Lubonja, were not merely relegated but subsequently expelled from the party in late 1973 for liberal deviation and right-wing opportunism. (104) Paçrami was another Western-educated intellectual, and former editor-in-chief of the Party paper Zeri i Popullit, but his calls for greater artistic freedom and less dogmatic adherence to socialist realism fell on stoney ground.

Milo Qirko, the Minister of Communications since 1966, and Aleks Verli, Minister of Finance from 1956, were the first of the economic officials

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to go in 1974, but the major blow struck home in June 1975. On that occasion the most prominent figure to disappear from the leadership was Italian-trained Abdyl Kellezi, Chairman of the State Planning Commission from 1968, one of the four Deputy Premiers from October 1974, and Politburo member from 1971. Along with him went Koço Theodhosi, the French-trained Minister of Industry and Mining since 1966, who had also been a member of the Politburo since 1971; Kico Ngjela, Minister of Foreign Trade from 1954 and a Central Committee member since 1956; as well as Ngjela's deputy Vasil Kati. (105) The Ministries involved were called upon, by the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, to put their houses in order and eliminate various irregularities in their work.

Hardly had the bureaucracy settled down after this than Hoxha struck again. In April 1976, Piro Dodbiba, Minister of Agriculture from 1965 and Candidate member of the Politburo from 1971, and Thoma Deljana, the Minister of Education and Culture from 1966, were dismissed, allegedly for serious mistakes in carrying out the party line and their ministerial functions. (106) Dodbiba's case was particularly surprising in view of some apparent successes in the agricultural field achieved over the preceding year.

By then the Council of Ministers had been almost entirely reconstructed and the leadership's policy orientations were re-affirmed without apparent fear of challenge. However, Hoxha, Shehu and the others could scarcely have made allowance for the death of Mao Tse Tung in September 1976, and more particularly the defeat of the Chinese radicals, the 'Gang of Four'. From 1971 onwards the growing Chinese links with Albania's favourite eminence grise, the USA, had become difficult to explain to Albanian citizens. Now, the relatively moderate faction in the Chinese leadership was aiming to reverse much of the Chinese experience that Albania was seeking to emulate.

Even allowing for a certain amount of Soviet inspiration behind some of the early rumours of increasing Sino-Albanian friction, (107) it was not long before the polemics surfaced into print. In July 1977, another of Albania's trusted guarantors appeared destined to be cast in the role of public enemy number one – a role almost as necessary to the continued justification of the rigid internal discipline as that of international protector and donor of aid. The question arose as to whether China would, like her predecessors in that role, bother herself by attempting to change the outlook of her unruly Albanian protege. From being the butt of criticism from Hoxha's opponents, would China in fact become the instrument of change opposed to Hoxha?

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That is a matter yet to be resolved.

From this survey of opposition, it is apparent that Albania's uncertain relations with the major powers have been a remarkable constant, or, more accurately, a common denominator through most of the upheavals that constituted serious challenges to the policies, power and position of Hoxha and his inner clique. Other indigenous opposition there may have been but the most serious dissent has been inspired from outside. Throughout the post-war period, Hoxha has shown a marked reluctance to make Albania merely the puppet of those whose protection and aid was sought; while at the same time his would-be guardians have shown a similar determination to undermine the regime or at least to get some political interest in return for their investment. Whether or not the Chinese take this attitude towards a rather small and distant land, well outside their main sphere of influence, is something that time alone will reveal.

All this leaves unanswered the question of where the Albanian leaders can go from here. One thing seems reasonably clear. With most of the immediately available bridges already burnt her options are very limited. The development of links with Yugoslavia in the early 1970s (108) has lost much of its momentum and the exchange of harsh words has continued from time to time. (109) The Soviet Union's advances of recent years have been consistently rebuffed with very little ceremony or consideration, (110) while Greece (111) and Italy are still politically and militarily too remote for anything more than an expansion of economic links. Among Albania's neighbours, only Romania has shown any inclination to accept her on a basis of mutual respect, but Romania is not protective superpower nor source of economic aid.

If a break with China becomes irrevocable, almost the only option available appears to be a large measure of 'going-it-alone'. This would be no novel solution, for having seen 'socialist internationalism' crumble to dust in the Sino-Soviet dispute, with its frequently puerile level of 'ideological' debate, a number of 'socialist' states are to be seen floundering around with concepts of self-sufficiency – making a virtue of necessity. Indeed, Stalin and the Soviet Union started this pattern with the policy of 'socialism in one country', while more recently, in North Korea, it has once again been pompously elevated to the level of a profound philosophical breakthrough entitled "the Juche idea." In Albania itself, "self-reliance" has already been fashionable for some time, and there is every reason to

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believe that it will continue to be projected as the principal plank of government policy – at least as long as Hoxha survives and external forces do not decide to intervene.

FOOTNOTES

(1) C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski: *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Harvard University Press, 1956.

(2) L. Schapiro: *Totalitarianism*, Macmillan, London 1972.

(3) See R. Marmullaku: *Albania and the Albanians*, Hurst, London, 1975, pp. 71-2; and A. Logoreci: *The Albanians*, Gollancz, London, 1977, pp. 89-90.

(4) See N. C. Pano: *The Peoples' Republic of Albania*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 59.

(5) *Ibid.* pp. 105-6.

(6) See A. Logoreci: *op. cit.*, pp. 84-5 and 106.

(7) See J. Amery: *Sons of the Eagle*, Macmillan, London, 1948, and P. Kemp: *No Colours or Crest*, Cassell, London, 1958.

(8) Cited in S. Skendi: *Albania*, New York, 1958, p. 136. These references have subsequently been excised from Hoxha's collected works.

(9) S. D. Kertesz ed: *The Fate of East Central Europe*, Notre Dame UP, 1956, p. 305.

(10) *The New York Times*, 7 November, 1947.

(11) 1946 is also given as the starting point in B. Page, D. Leitch & P. Knightley: *Philby – The Spy who betrayed a Generation*, Deutsch, London, 1968, p. 193.

(12) See H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, Methuen, London, 1956, p. 226.

(13) *The Times*, London, 9 July 1946.

(14) *The Times*, 14 and 29 July, 1947.

(15) See H. Seton-Watson: *op.cit.*, p. 227.

(16) *The Times*, 27 January, 1948. Undoubtedly such charges were used on occasions in more mundane early purges of those not in sympathy with the new regime. At present it is difficult to discriminate with certainty between the valid and the merely expedient.

(17) Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 106.

(18) An account of this operation by one of its organisers, appeared in *The Sunday Times*, London, 4 November, 1973.

(19) *The Times*, 7 June, 1950. A note of complaint was sent to Italy by the Albanians in July 1950, one only of a number were to follow.

(20) *Ibid.*, 1 January, 1951.

(21) *Ibid.*, 2 January, 1951.

(22) *Ibid.*, 17 October, 1951.

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(23) *Ibid.*, 29 October, 1951.

(24) B. Page et.al: *op. cit.*, p. 197.

(25) Trials of 'spies' and 'saboteurs' continued to occur – see *The Times*, 27 February and 23 June, 1953 – though it is not clear whether these were genuine or prophylatic cases, nor whether they received any external support.

(26) For details see W. E. Griffith: *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, MIT, 1963, pp. 18-19; and A. Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 88.

(27) See N. Pano: *op.cit.*, p. 67.

(28) *Lufta e Partisë së Punes së Shquiperisë kundër . . . LKJ* (The struggle of the APL against the unfriendly intervention of the revisionist leadership of the YLC into the internal affairs of our country), Tirana, 1958, pp. 17-21.

(29) H. Seton-Watson: *op.cit.*, p. 227; M. Ebon: *World Communism Today*, New York, 1948, pp. 155-6; and Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 94.

(30) See Pano: *op.cit.*, p. 76.

(31) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, I, p. 388 – initially this was reported as an accident 'while cleaning his gun'.

(32) See Griffith: *op.cit.*, p. 20.

(33) Pano: *op.cit.*, p. 82.

(34) *Dokumenta Kryesorë të Partisë së Punës se Shquipërisë*, Tiranë, Vol. 1, 1960, pp. 389-91.

(35) *Ibid.*, pp. 376-404.

(36) H. Hamm: *Albania – China's Beachhead in Europe*, Praeger, 1963, pp. 95-6.

(37) *The Times*, 11 December 1948, and *Dokumenta Kryesore*, 1, pp. 405, 484-5.

(38) See R. L. Wolfe: *The Balkans in Our Time*, Harvard UP, 1956, p. 379, and H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 227-9.

(39) *Radio Tiranë*, 10 June, 1949.

(40) *Ibid*, 13 June, 1949, and *Dokumenta Kryesore*, 1, pp. 484-5.

(41) See *Borba*, Belgrade, 21 March, 1961.

(42) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, Tiranë, 1961, Vol. 2, pp. 15-19.

(43) Logoreci: op.cit., *p. 107.*

(44) *Ibid.*

(45) *Ibid.*, pp. 20-32; and Logoreci: *op.cit.*, pp. 104-5.

(46) *Rruga e Partisë*, Tiranë, VI, November 1959, p. 90.

(47) A. Gegai and R. Krasniqi: *Albania*, ACEN, New York, 1964, p. 29, and Pano: *op.cit.*, p. 94.

(48) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, 11, pp. 61-8.

(49) *The New York Times*, 17 April, 1952. A further source indicates that, by the very end of the anti-Titoist purges, 14 Central Committee members and 32 of the 109 deputies of the People's Assembly were liquidated – Z. K. Brzezinski: *The Soviet Bloc*, Praeger, 1963, p. 431.

(50) Pano: *op.cit.*, p. 107.

(51) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, 11, pp. 550-1; and A. Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 115.

(52) See J. Birch: The Albanian Political Experience, in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp. 374-75.

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(53) See Griffith: *op.cit.*, p. 24; Pano: *op.cit.*, pp. 117-18; and Birch: *op.cit.*, p.375.

(54) See reconstruction from Yugoslav sources in Griffith: *op.cit.*, pp. 24-6; also A. Logoreci: *op.cit.*, pp. 119-20.

(55) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, 11, p. 481.

(56) *Dokumenta Kryesore*, Tiranë, 1970, Vol. 111.

(57) *Pravda*, Moscow, 29 October, 1961.

(58) *Borba*, Belgrade, 27 May, 1961.

(59) *The Times*, 21 May, 1957.

(60) *Ibid.*, 4 June, 1957.

(61) *Ibid.*

(62) *Dokumenta Kryesore, Tiranë, 1970, 111.*

(63) *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, Bristol 18042A.

(64) *Radio Tiranë*, 11 May, 1959.

(65) A. Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 193.

(66) See Griffith: *op.cit.*, p. 24.

(67) *Pravda*, 29 October, 1961.

(68) *Zeri i Popullit*, Tiranë, 8 November, 1961 (speech by Hoxha) and 9 January, 1962.

(69) *Zeri i Popullit*, 25 March, 1962.

(70) See Logoreci: *op. cit.*, p. 126 & 129-30.

(71) *The Times*, 6 October, 1961, and *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 18302A.

(72) *Ibid.*; *Borba*, Belgrade, 28 May, 1961; *Radio Tiranë* and *Zeri i Popullit*, *16-26* May, 1961; and *Le Procès contre the complot organise pour liquider la République d'Albanie*, Tiranë, 1961. Hoxha's speech at the Party Congress in February 1961 foreshadowed these charges – see *Zeri i Popullit*, 14 February, 1961.

(73) Except for *Trud*, 28 May, 1961.

(74) Compare the *New China News Agency* edition of that date with that in *Zeri i Popullit*, 7 June, 1960.

(75) N. Khrushchev: *Khrushchev Remembers*, Penguin, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 507 and Vol. 2, p. 316.

(76) Removal announced in *Zeri i Popullit*, 9 September 1960. See also *The Times* 10 September, 1960.

(77) See speech by Mikoyan at the 22nd CPSU Congress, Moscow, *Pravda*, 22 October, 1961.

(78) C.f. *The New York Times*, 20 March, 1961, and *Pravda*, 22 October, 1961.

(79) See Griffith: *op.cit.*, pp. 54-5.

(80) *Pravda*, 29 October, 1961.

(81) *See Zeri i Popullit*, 25 March, 1962.

(82) See H. Hamm: *op.cit.*, pp. 13-14.

(83) See Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 193.

(84) *Ibid.*, pp. 152-3.

(85) *L'Unita*, 21 July, 1969.

(86) Rumours of previous purges of high-ranking officers which circulated in early

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1973 may simply have been connected with disapproval of the wholesale adoption of Chinese models within the armed forces. Among the alleged casualties were said to have been Generals Halim Xhelo, Gjin Marku, and Zoi Themeli.

(87) *The Financial Times*, 12 September, 1974; *The Guardian* and *The Financial Times*, 31 October, 1974.

(88) N. Khrushchev: *Khrushchev Remembers*, Vol. 2, p. 316.

(89) See *The Scotsman*, Edinburgh and *The Morning Star*, London, 1 May, 1976.

(90) *Rruga e Partise*, Tiranë, August 1976.

(91) See *The Guardian*, London, 29 January, 1976, and the *Financial Times*, London, 2 November, 1976.

(92) The new Central Committee of November 1966 revealed the impact at lower levels: 43 of the 77 members, and 18 of the 38 candidate members were new – see *The Financial Times*, 2 November, 1976, and L. Zanga: The Congress of the Great Purge, *RFE Background Report* 230, Munich, 9 November, 1976.

(93) See e.g. L. Zanga: Changes in Albanian Leadership Signify Struggle for Succession to Power, *RFE Research Background Report* 161, Munich, 24 November, 1975.

(94) See Zanga: *op.cit.*, 24 November, 1975, p. 6, and Logoreci: *op.cit.* pp. 152-3.

(95) See details in *Zanga*: *Ibid.*, p. 7.

(96) The campaign was launched by an article in *Zeri i Popullit*, 3 April, 1975.

(97) *The Guardian*, 25 May, 1976.

(98) See his speech to the account and reporting meeting of CC apparat workers in E. Hoxha: *Speeches 1971-73*, Tirane, 1974.

(99) See e.g. *The Guardian*, 25 May, 1976.

(100) See *Zeri i Popullit*, 25 July, 1976, and commentary in *The Financial Times*, 27 July, 1976.

(101) Speech to the 7th Party Congress, November 1976.

(102) See E. Hoxha: *op.cit.*

(103) See J. C. Kun: Anti-Liberalism Campaign Claims first Victims, *RFE Research Paper*, Albania, 26 July, 1973.

(104) See J. C. Kun: Veteran Regime Functionary Ousted in Latest Purge, *RFE Research Paper*, Albania 1860, Munich, 7 August, 1973; *Il Messagero*, Rome, 18 and 25 August, 1973; *The Observer*, London, 26 August, 1973; L. Zanga: *op.cit.*, 24 November, 1975; R. Marmullaku: *Albania and the Albanians*, Hurst, 1975, pp. 65-6; and Logoreci: *op.cit.*, p. 164.

(105) See *The Guardian*, 28 October, 1975; *The Times* and *Financial Times*, 31 October, 1975; *The Times*, 18 November, 1975; and Zanga, *op.cit.*, 24 November, 1975.

(106) *The Scotsman* & *Morning Star*, 1 May, 1976, and L. Zanga: Whither Albania, *RFE Research Background Report* 112, 18 May, 1976.

(107) Some of these saw the light of day in the Hungarian press, e.g. *Nepsbadsag*, Budapest, 23 September 1972.

(108) See e.g. *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 January 1970 & *RFE Research Papers* Albania 0825, 10 December, 1970; Albania 0883, 8 February, 1971.

(109) See e.g. *Zeri i Popullit*, 15 June, 1972 commenting on Tito's visit to the

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(110) See e.g. Rruga & Partise, January 1971; *Zeri i Popullit*, 27 April, 1971 and 3 November, 1976.

(111) Diplomatic relations were agreed to in May 1971.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOCIAL CLASSES OF RUSSIA

By Vincent J. Knapp

The great revolutionary doctrine of the 20th century is not Marxism, it is Leninism. It is Leninism which has inspired the formation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Communist parties around the globe. Leninism deserves to be recognized as a separate ideology, unique both in its ideas and in the way it has achieved success. Fundamentally, Leninism may be described as a major revision of Marxism, a vital, new interpretation that takes revolutionary initiative away from the masses within society and hands it over to a revolutionary elite. (1) Only if Leninism is seen for what it is, essentially an elitist doctrine, can the actual history of Russia in the 20th century be adequately understood.

Given Lenin's upbringing and intellectual contacts it was almost inevitable that Lenin would write a basically elitist attitude into his own unique interpretation of Marx. Born into a rich and well-to-do family, Lenin had enjoyed a truly privileged background. Like the vast majority of Communist leaders – there are a few exceptions – Lenin came from the middle or upper reaches of society. Born into the elite, surrounded by comfort, University-educated as a lawyer, Lenin remained throughout his life separated and divorced from the masses. In all of this, he is no different from Castro, the son of a rich and well-to-do banker, or Ho Chi Minh, the son of a lawyer and judge, or Khieu Samphan, the leader of the Cambodian Communist Party, the son of a high-ranking civil servant. All of which suggests one thing about Communist revolutionary leadership, that it tends to be composed of alienated members of the more well-to-do portion of the population. In more specific terms, it comes overwhelmingly from the more prosperous classes of pre-revolutionary society.

During his early years, Lenin lived an isolated existence, supported by his family's wealth, never knowing the various levels of the working class or the peasantry. Even though he had opportunities at home and abroad to work among mass elements, the only significant contact he had with the

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working classes was for three months in 1895 in St. Petersburg when he agitated among factory workers. (2) This experience only confirmed his previous impression that the masses were not astute, that they were lacking in awareness and that on their own they might advocate reform but that they were constitutionally incapable of thinking in terms of a total, revolutionary transformation of society. (3) Only the educated elite, he argued, again and again, is really conscious of the overall development of society and it alone deserves to lead. Thus the elite – originally the Bolshevik, now the Communist Party – emerges in Leninism in a superior position and the masses in a secondary role. You will not find this idea in the writings of Karl Marx. Its origin is perhaps to be traced to the Russian Populist Peter Lavrov, who, writing in the 1860's, argued that society was basically divided into the elite and the mass, and that it was the function of the educated elite to lead the unconscious masses into a new type of existence. (4) Lenin took this basic concept from Lavrov and gave it ideological respectability. The Party and the Party alone knows the true course of historical development, the proper path to take in order to achieve the total transformation and betterment of society. In more succinct terms, it, the party, has truth on its side. To allow any other political party besides the Communists to function, would be a disservice to the masses, according to Lenin, for they would be only confused by other, less enlightened points of view. Thus, the Bolsheviks outlawed all other political parties in Russia between 1917 and 1922 for this reason. In an interview given a few years back to the New York Times Alvaro Cunhal, the head of the Portuguese Communist Party, echoed this selfsame Leninist idea when he declared that of all of Portugal's parties, the Portuguese Communists alone knew how to achieve the social transformation of Portuguese society; only his party, he declared, was truly revolutionary. (5)

Within Russia, the concept of elitist leadership, unhampered by other political points of view, held out a powerful attraction for other men, who like Lenin usually came from privileged backgrounds in Russian society. Like him, they became revolutionaries and just like him they were essentially, alienated members of the rich and well-to-do portion of the Russian population. What this means is that, after the Bolshevik takeover of power, Russia was essentially ruled by men who came originally from the business, professional and even the aristocratic elements in society. Many of them were the sons of civil servants or engineers, like Lenin, Kamenev and Bukharin. Quite a few, including Lenin, Bukharin, Rykov and Kristinsky were

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lawyers, men who had graduated from Russia's most prestigious schools such as the University of St. Petersburg, Moscow and Kazan. Others like Kirov were trained engineers. Just as revealing are the social origins of certain key Bolsheviks who were destined to hold high positions in the military and the police after 1917. Tukhachevsky, later the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, was the son of a Russian aristocrat. Dzerzhinski, the very first head of the Soviet secret police, the Cheka, was from a Polish titled family, (6) while numbers of the early Commissars were of the educated and relatively prosperous Jewish community, rather than members of the ethnic Russian working class, whose inherent nationalism and Eastern Orthodox Christian upbringing inclined them to support the old order and even to hold the Czar in reverence as a "father."

More evidence exists to prove that the Russian Communist party was essentially recruited from the upper echelons of society. Two-thirds of the top 15,000 Bolshevik officials in 1921 were of middle class origin, it was difficult to find a worker or peasant among them. (7) Beyond this, it is known that 80 percent of the Bolshevik party leadership in 1917 came from the upper five percent, income-wise, of Russia's pre-revolutionary population. Studies done at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University show that the Bolsheviks had the same proportion of University graduates as elite groups in the United States, Britain and France exercising political power in the 1910's. (8)

What does all of this evidence suggest? It suggests that the Bolsheviks with their elitist backgrounds had little or no understanding of the workers or peasants for whom they claimed to speak. Although, they had come to power, they said, in the name of the masses, by upbringing and by choice, the Bolsheviks had never really mingled with those whom they now claimed to represent. They knew little about the desires or aspirations of the masses, and so not knowing them, they began to experiment with them, first with the working class and then with the peasantry. The Communists, of course, claimed ideologically, to be speaking for the masses, but considering the highly elitist character of the Bolsheviks, it was almost inevitable, given their divorce from the masses, that they would fail in their attempt to appreciate the masses and their desires. Only if one accepts this premise, can one understand why the Soviet Union today has moved so far from the principle of economic equality so loudly proclaimed in 1917.

Immediately after the Bolsheviks took power they did make some

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significant organizational power concessions, primarily to the factory class in the cities. They decided momentarily, at least, to depend upon the working class. They did this by expropriating the pre-revolutionary owners of industrial establishments and mines and by chasing away the old managerial class. They then surrendered the management of these industrial firms, now state-owned, to the workers themselves. But the workers proved unable to revive industry. So, within a few short months, the Communists began to train their own class of managers to replace the group of managers that had now left. The working class had effective control of industry for only a short period of time before the Communists reestablished, over them, a class of well-compensated directors and managers. (9) Thus did Lenin, who in 1917 had expelled the old elite – the major portion of the old aristocracy and the upper middle class – begin to create a brand new middle class elite. That new elite, composed of economic planners, engineers, government officials and industrial and farm managers – receiving higher and higher remuneration as time went on – became the driving force behind the industrialization of Russia beginning with the first Five-Year Plan in the late 1920's. In order to get the capital to perpetuate economic growth the government under Stalin imposed upon the working class excise taxes that doubled the price of bread, meat and clothing for the average working class family. (10) As a consequence the workers' standard of living dropped precipitously, a fact that the Soviet government under Malenkov officially admitted, rather remarkably, in the 1950's.

Lenin's elitist ideas, which downgraded the masses from the start, did not lead then to equality but rather to the creation of a new elite – a new upper middle class elite – whose advantage grew and developed under Stalin. (11) A new Communist elite, distinctly middle class in occupation and outlook, was coming into existence in Russia in the inter-war period, in spite of ideological pronouncements to the contrary. This new element, composed of government bureaucrats, engineers, army officers, factory and farm managers and police officials was the logical outgrowth of Lenin's own elitist assumptions. By 1940 it was a firmly established middle class group, its standard of living expanding at the expense of both the workers and the peasants, whose standard of living was in turn declining. Stalin made sure that this new bureaucratic elite – housed within the Communist Party – could not only gain wealth, but at the same time, could perpetuate it. For during the early 1940's, the highest income tax rate in the Soviet Union was set at 13 percent, all of which meant that the higher income groups never

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paid more than 13 percent of their annual income in the form of taxes. Ruling officials could not only acquire wealth, they could also pass it on from one generation to another because the inheritance tax in the Soviet Union was lowered in 1943 to only 10 percent. (12)

Lenin and Stalin were the architects of a new Soviet elite that grew and developed not only at the expense of the working class in the cities, but also to the detriment of the much larger class of Russian peasants. The standard of living of the peasants was also ultimately depressed as a result of the coming of Communist rule. Initially, Lenin left the peasants alone because he was afraid they would not produce sufficient food for the cities. But under Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – with its basic Leninist assumption that the party knows what is best for the masses – began to destroy the private plots of the peasants and force the peasantry onto huge collective farms. Again, like the factory workers of the industrial cities of Russia, the peasants found themselves being directed by a specially trained Communist elite, which appeared in the countryside in the form of collective farm managers and supervisors, eventually some 250,000 of them.

These elitist elements from the cities, cadres as they were called, were sent to transform the Russian countryside, to end the tradition of private peasant farming and to introduce instead collectivized cultivation of the land. Secret police reports captured first by the Germans and then by the Americans prove the existence of wide-spread peasant resistance to collectivization. (13) Scores of Communist officials were evidently murdered, others physically beaten. But the Party struck back, anyone resisting the process of collectivization was immediately labelled a class enemy and deported. In this way, probably up to 5 million peasants were deported to collectives hundreds and hundreds of miles from their original native villages. Actual physical resistance by a significant minority of peasants during the process of collectivization was surpassed by an even greater protest by the majority of peasants, the mass slaughter of farm animals. Rather than surrender their livestock to the collectives, the Russian peasants slaughtered half of the swine, sheep, cattle and horses in the country – a total of 170 million animals. Even worse for agricultural production, peasant initiative was lacking on the collectives once they did come into existence. Official Soviet publications during the 1930's kept insisting that agricultural production was remaining, at least, level. (14) Only later during the 1950's, did the Soviet government, again under Malenkov, officially admit the wide-spread

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collapse of agricultural production during the 1930's. The alienation of the peasantry did not stop with Communist land policy. The peasants were also excluded from the meager social security system of the times and village schools provided little education beyond reading and writing.

While the new Soviet middle class was growing more affluent and more powerful in the inter-war period, the masses, not only the factory class but perhaps more importantly the much larger peasantry failed to benefit from the new Soviet system. It is little wonder that rule by the Communist elite inside of Russia nearly collapsed with the German invasion of 1941. That attack proved that the Communist elite had failed to win wide-spread popular support prior to 1941. The Russian army, generally speaking, refused to fight for the Communist regime in 1941 and 1942. All told, some 3 million Russians surrendered to the Germans during the early stages of the war, possibly the greatest case of mass surrender in the annals of military history. Everywhere the invading German armies were greeted as liberators. Captured German film shows them being cheered by crowds in the cities and by priests and peasants in numerous villages. Almost immediately, the peasants began to dismantle the collectives and return to the system of private peasant plots. Just as immediately, the Germans threw away their advantages in Russia, first by treating the civilian population as a conquered inferior people and then by restoring the collectives, this time for their own benefit. (15) Given a new lease on life, the Communists now began to portray themselves as nationalists. As they did, popular sentiment began to swing away from the Germans and toward the Communists. Stalin and the Party were quick to realize that they could win loyalties by taking advantage of the most powerful ideology of the 20th century, the doctrine of nationalism. The Communist Party was not really defending the Soviet system, from which it alone had benefitted, it was now protecting the Russian "motherland" from the German "barbarians."

Certain political leaders at the front like Malenkov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev realized that Communist Party rule had nearly come to an end in Russia in 1941 and 1942. Something, they calculated, would have to be done in the post-war period to win popular support for a regime which up to now had benefitted the few but not the many. (16) These more progressive leaders realized their chance with the death of Stalin in 1953, the man who had been mainly responsible for bringing the new Soviet middle class into existence. Predictably, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev did not set out in the post-Stalinist era to disturb the

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dominant position of the new Soviet elite. Instead, they decided to tie the masses to the Soviet regime by means of major economic concessions that would benefit both the working class and the peasantry. From here on, the Soviet system was going to raise the standard of living of the elite and the mass, proving that Communist rule could benefit the lower classes in a way that it had not in the inter-war period.

The key figure in all of this was Malenkov. From the start, he was dedicated to the idea of making major concessions to the masses. He attempted to do this by changing the focus of Soviet industry, away from the production of capital goods, such as hydroelectric stations and steel plants, and in the direction of consumer goods. (17) He fell from power before he could achieve his goal, being replaced by one of his chief critics, Khrushchev. But once he achieved power, Khrushchev found that the demands of the Russian masses for a better way of life could not be denied. Of peasant origin himself, Khrushchev proved that his concerns went beyond those that were good for the bureaucratic elite. In this regard Khrushchev may be seen as a populist. (18) The same term, populist, may also be applied to Brezhnev, who like Khrushchev was born into the lower class. Brezhnev was originally a factory worker, who like Khrushchev rose to power within the structure of the Communist Party mechanism. (19) Born low, Khrushchev and Brezhnev understood the social groups from which they had sprung. It could be argued that the concessions that these two men were able to make to the masses in the form of an ever-increasing standard of living were based on expediency. If Communist Party rule was ever going to survive, they literally had to introduce economic and social reforms in order to win the cooperation of the Russian population. There is a great deal of truth in the idea that their policies became policies of appeasement.

Khrushchev's major achievement was that he absorbed the peasantry into the Soviet system for the very first time. Under Khrushchev, economic concessions dramatically increased by 300-400 percent the payments which the government made to the collective farms for crops which the collectives were forced to deliver to the government. This automatically tripled and quadrupled peasant income, albeit rather low to begin with. Beyond this, government subsidies for fertilizers and equipment helped to increase production and thereby peasant incomes even more. These direct benefits were supplemented by the introduction of educational reforms which made it possible for a peasant to achieve a secondary education and then go on to a University. Prior to this time, their way up the social scale had been

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effectively blocked by the absence of secondary schools in the countryside. The Soviet government capped off all of these concessions by including the peasantry, for the very first time, beginning in 1964, in Russia's very extensive social security system. Khrushchev fell from power in 1964 largely because his redistribution of wealth inside the Soviets was threatening the entrenched position of bureaucratic ruling classes. Under Khrushchev, a larger and larger proportion of the gross national product was being extended to the masses, especially the peasantry. (20) Even more disturbing was Khrushchev's often expressed desire to achieve economic equality inside Russia. Such a goal would have threatened the privileged position of the bureaucratic ruling class – and there is nothing more frightening to a Communist leader than the equalitarian implications of real communism.

Brezhnev came to power in 1964 to defend the rights and privileges of the new Soviet elite, but he too turned out to be a populist, although a somewhat tamer one, and soon began to follow Khrushchev's policy of significant economic concessions to the masses. Under Brezhnev, peasant income continued to rise, thanks to increasing government payments for collective farm products. Meanwhile, peasant and working-class elements both continued to benefit from better medical and dental care, more generous maternity concessions and better retirement conditions (for women at 55 and men at 60). Under Brezhnev, an even more unique event has occurred. For the first time in Soviet history, the government in the late 60's and early 70's spent more on basic consumer items than it did on heavy industry. (21) All of these policies have ensured greater support, or acquiescence, among the Soviet population for the regime: the desires of the masses are at last receiving some consideration. (22) When Brezhnev got up at the 24th Party Congress in 1971 he barely mentioned the name of Marx, but he did insist that the Party was committed to an annual increase in the Russian standard of living and a significant improvement in the diet of the average worker. (23)

By contrast, under the rule of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Soviet Union has witnessed an unprecedented amount of public dissent. This dissent has come from within the Soviet middle class. It has been spear-headed by scientists and literary figures. (24) This civil rights movement has disturbed, but not dislodged, the ruling hierarchy, in power to protect the upper levels of Soviet society. While the dissidents have won wide publicity outside of Russia, they cannot be expected to win widespread mass support inside of Russia. Indeed, one of the leading Soviet dissidents,

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Vladimir Bukovsky, sees it as essentially a conflict wihin the elite. (25) That conflict, thus far, has involved only marginal elements, peripheral groups which up to now have been largely contained by the Soviet secret police.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been elitist from beginning to end. Inspired by Leninism, with its inherent elitist assumptions, the Party has remained a Party of the elite, for the elite, socially distant from the masses. Indeed, the Russian revolution may now be seen sociologically for what it actually was, a process by which one elite replaced another in power. The revolutionary elite that took over after 1917, drawn largely from rebellious segments of the educated classes had little or no true sympathy for, or understanding of, the masses in Russian society. They were fundamentally concerned with remolding Russia, with the working class and the peasantry forced to follow the lead provided by the Communist Party. The Communists always justified their demands for more and more sacrifices from the masses by saying "we are building a new Communist society" or by saying "we are making the Soviets stronger." Either way the masses were always used. They have always been led by an elite who viewed them as a kind of raw material to be reeducated, reshaped or remolded. Only in more recent years after Stalin, under men who were born low – men like Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who knew the masses because they came from them – has it been found convenient to allow the mass of workers and peasants to share in some of the material benefits of the expanding economy, but still without any effort being made to include them in the political or decision-making process.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Alfred Meyer, *Leninism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 32-34. For this idea in practice, see *II kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internationala, stenograficheskii otchet* (Petrograd, 1921), pp. 569-570.

(2) Bertram Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, 1948), p. 124.

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(3) Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 30 Vols. (Moscow, 1926-30), Vol. II, p. 514

(4) Peter Lavrov, *Historical Letters* in V. V. Zenovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (London, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 359 ff.

(5) *The New York Times Magazine*, July 13, 1975, pp. 9-11, 46.

(6) Heinrich E. Schulz, Paul K. Urban and Andrew I. Lebed, *Who Was Who in the USSR* (Metuchen, New Jersey, 1972), pp. 94, 150-151, 253, 277-278, 315, 344-345, 489, and 554.

(7) Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Revised ed. (New York, 1971), p. 241.

(8) George K. Schueller, *The Politburo* (Stanford, 1951), pp. 1-44.

(9) Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 422.

(10) For an explanation of these considerations, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), pp. 360, 362 and 414.

(11) Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York, 1958), pp. 48-49.

(12) For a discussion of direct taxes in the Soviet Union, see Michael Kaser, *Soviet Economics* (New York, 1970), pp. 147-149.

(13) For a case in point, see Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 238-264.

(14) M. Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization*, trans. by Irene Nove (New York, 1968), pp. 426 ff.

(15) The story of mass defection of Red Army troops to the Germans is told in Jurgen Thorwald, *The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies*, trans. by Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1975).

(16) For a sustained look at the elitist nature of the Communist Party, see T.H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.* (Princeton, 1968).

(17) Harry Schwartz, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin* (Philadelphia, 1965), pp. 53-73.

(18) Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev: A Career* (New York, 1966), p. 1.

(19) As an illustration of the psychological outlook of Soviet leaders, see Schwartz, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*, p. 57.

(20) Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, trans. by Helen Katel (New York, 1969), pp. 244 ff.

(21) Tatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 494 ff.

(22) For information about levels of consumption in the Soviet Union, see Philip Hanson, *The Consumer in the Soviet Economy* (Evanston, Illinois, 1968), pp. 21-82; *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, International Labour Office* (Geneva, 1975), pp. 604 and 613; and *Yearbook of the National Accounts Statistics 1975, United Nations Publication* (New York, 1976), p. 719.

(23) *Pravda*, March 31, 1971, pp. 1-2; *New York Times*, March 31, 1971, p. 14.

(24) Sergius Yakobson, *Aspects of Intellectual Ferment and Dissent in the Soviet Union* (Washington, 1968), pp. 21-81; and Harry G. Shaffer, *The Soviet Treatment of Jews* (New York, 1974), p. 4-12.

(25) *The New York Times*, March 15, 1977, p. 18.

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IN DEFENSE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY

By Dwight R. Lee

Making international comparisons has become an increasingly popular exercise by those critics of the U.S. economy who are enamored with the "advantages" of yet more economic participation and control by the government. Typically the U.S. economy is taken as illustrative of a market economy and its performance is compared with that of economies widely considered to be controlled by central planners. Based on the comparisons made, the U.S. economy is found deficient and the conclusion is reached that we need to enlarge the participation of government in our economy if we want to experience real economic progress and equity.

This argument can be effective for at least two reasons. First, to those who feel that differences in economic systems can be compared in isolation of personal and political freedoms, such an argument may appear to tell the entire story and therefore be very compelling. Secondly, with those of us who have a philosophical attachment to individual freedoms and believe that a free market economy is the only economic system compatible with these freedoms, as well as the most efficient at producing what consumers desire, there is a tendency to react defensively to comparisons which put our economy in a negative light. This defensive posture is not only awkward but distracts from the important task of criticizing the tendency toward increasing state control over our economy and the resulting damage to economic efficiency and personal liberties.

Notwithstanding the foregoing comments, this paper is largely motivated by defensive instincts. The charge that the U.S. economy is not delivering the goods relative to centrally controlled economies simply cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged. The performance of the U.S. economy not only can be, but deserves to be, defended against this charge. This defensive posture is also justified as a means of countering the otherwise persuasive argument that the market mechanism, as typified by the U.S. economy, is inferior to governmental control as a way of organizing economic activity.

The first point that needs to be made is the inappropriateness of the

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countries inevitably chosen to compare with the U.S., given the stated objective of demonstrating the virtues of centrally planned economies. The economies that consistently make their appearance are those of Japan and a few Western European countries, in particular Sweden, West Germany, Denmark and Switzerland. One is justified in wondering why, if there is really confidence in the advantages of central planning and control, we do not find our economic performance compared with that of countries which most extensively rely on centralized economic decision-making; countries such as the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland. But let's not be surprised at the choice of examples. When attempting to substantiate a view with little factual support it is easy to understand the need to select evidence carefully. It just happens that the comparison economies are ideally chosen, since in the public mind they are viewed as centrally planned and controlled. This is particularly true in the case of Sweden. But this widespread view is, in fact, wrong. The economies of Japan, West Germany, and Sweden, the three most prominently mentioned, are predominantly market economies with the bulk of the productive decisions being made by the private sector in response to market incentives. For example, more than 90% of Swedish industry is privately owned and controlled. In many respects the productive sector of these economies is less subject to government controls than in the U.S. economy. The choice of examples actually indicate an implicit awareness that if the objective is to put the U.S. economy in an unfavorable light, comparisons had better be made with economies benefiting from a relatively strong private sector.

Ignoring, however, the inappropriateness of the economies typically chosen for comparison, a careful look at the comparisons that are made will show that the U.S. economy performs much better than its critics would like us to believe. We will see that the comparisons the critics make and the conclusions they reach are either wrong, highly misleading, or, when properly interpreted, actually illustrate the advantage of a market economy over a centrally directed one.

There are three criteria which are almost always used in critically contrasting U.S. economic performance against the competition. The criteria are per capita gross national product (GNP), income distribution, and the growth rate of industrial capacity. It should go without saying that the use of any criteria which are constructed with statistical aggregates, as these are, is fraught with difficulty. This is particularly true when using them to make comparisons between countries.

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The use of GNP statistics for making inter-country comparisons provides a good case in point. Procedures for constructing GNP figures vary from country to country and any attempt at comparisons requires that somewhat arbitrary adjustments be made. Even in the absence of this problem there remains the difficult problem of determining the relative value of dollars, kronars, marks, and yen, something that has to be done accurately if GNP comparisons between countries are to be meaningful. Unfortunately there is no best way to determine these relative values and one has some latitude in choosing an approach best suited for his purpose. One does not have to be overly cynical to suspect that this latitude is being fully exercised by critics of the U.S. economy when they cite figures showing the U.S. trailing Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark in per capita GNP. Thurow, (*Newsweek*, Feb. 4, 1977), claims per capita GNP is 20% higher in Sweden and Switzerland than in the U.S., that we are also behind Denmark in this category, and are about to be surpassed by Norway and West Germany. What is never pointed out is that quite different figures can be obtained using different, but strictly legitimate, statistical procedures. United Nations figures for 1975 show the U.S. with a per capita GNP 10% higher than Sweden's, 32% higher than Switzerland's, 43% higher than Denmark's, 40% higher than West Germany's, and 50% higher than Norway's.

Another source of difficulty in meaningfully contrasting the GNP of different countries arises from the fact that many services are financed through taxation and distributed by the government at prices, often zero, which are less than cost. In measuring GNP it is customary to value these services on the basis of the cost of providing them. With most of the countries the critics find so attractive imposing high personal taxes to finance extensive social services, a high percentage of their output is valued, not at what consumers voluntarily pay in the market, but at how much they involuntarily pay through taxes. This makes it rather naive to assume that even if per capita GNP in Sweden, for example, is higher than in the U.S., where a relatively smaller percentage of output is valued at government cost, that consumers are better off in Sweden than the U.S.

But what about the charge that the wealth that is generated by our economy is unfairly spread around, with the distribution of income much less equal in the U.S. than in other countries? We hear, for example, that the top ten percent of U.S. households receive fifteen times as much income as the bottom ten percent, while the same comparison yields 7, 10, and 11 times as much for Sweden, Japan, and West Germany respectively. Again

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taking a defensive stance, and ignoring the question about the equity of coerced ex-post equality, it has to be pointed out that statistics of this type are highly misleading without an awareness of what they leave unsaid.

Statistics on income distribution tell us how the incomes earned over a given year are distributed, but give no information of lifetime incomes. And lifetime incomes will invariably be more evenly distributed than yearly incomes because of the fluctuations, or upward trends, that individuals experience in their year to year earnings. For example, two individuals could have identical lifetime incomes but never have the same income in a given year. This means that country A could have a more equal distribution of lifetime incomes than country B, but show greater income inequality according to income statistics. This would be likely to happen, in fact, if country B has an extensive income distribution program, such as Sweden's, which moderates fluctuations and upward movements in individual incomes.

There is also the issue of whether the distribution of monetary wealth and income should be used as the sole measure of the distribution of economic well-being. It probably is appropriate to do so in economies such as ours, where most goods and services are allocated on the basis of willingness and ability to pay. But it is clearly inappropriate to do so in economies where a large percentage of goods are allocated through the government on the basis of criteria determined by the government. Under these conditions monetary income becomes less important relative to position and political power as a measure of affluence, and statistics on income distribution will understate the real inequalities that exist. The Soviet Union provides a striking illustration of this point. Brezhnev's official salary is reported to be 900 rubles a month, only about 4½ times as much as the average urban family in the Soviet Union. Yet clearly this is a meaningless comparison if we are interested in the differences in real income.

Another important aspect of income distribution that is either ignored or distorted by the critics concerns the opportunities for individuals to move up the economic ladder. A market economy excels at offering this opportunity by rewarding people on the basis of productivity and performance irrespective of their previous economic status. Since no economy is, or ever will be, a pure market economy, we will never find rewards determined strictly by productivity. But with income in the U.S. economy still being determined primarily by impersonal market forces we would expect to observe a substantial amount of income mobility from one generation

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to the next. The evidence is consistent with this expectation and belies the widespread belief that our rich get richer as our poor get poorer. Statistics on income mobility show that, even though, the top fifth of all U.S. households receive incomes 800 percent greater than the bottom fifth, the children of the prosperous fifth receive only 75 percent more than children of the bottom fifth.

The critics numbers simply do not establish, relative to the rest of the world (or even selected countries), that our income distribution is marked by large inequalities. It is quite likely, however, that, by taking their advice and moving toward more government control over the dispersement of economic rewards, real income distribution will become less equal as political influence and pull become more important, and productivity less important, in determining this distribution.

We also find the U.S. economy berated for failing to expand its productive capacity as rapidly as a few countries such as Sweden, West Germany,. and Japan. The explanation for this, we are told, lies in the fact that we do not have enough government planning and social spending programs. There is in fact a much more plausible explanation. The productive capacity of an economy grows in response to incentives and U.S. policy has, in comparison to other countries, reduced those incentives. Sweden, for example, collected 3.9% of its total tax revenue from company income in 1972, while in the U.S. it was 11.2%.

The huge federal deficits that we have experienced in recent years have also had a retarding effect on the growth of productive capacity. Unless these deficits are financed through the creation of money (approximately 40% of them are, which lies at the root of our decade of inflation), the government has to finance them by borrowing funds which could otherwise be used for private investment. The larger the deficits the more significant this "crowding out" effect is likely to be. Again it is not surprising that countries such as Sweden, Japan and West Germany have increased productivity more rapidly than the U.S. Figuring the government budget in Sweden as it is figured in the U.S. shows the Swedish budget running a consistent surplus. The same is true of Japan, and as a percent of GNP the West Germany deficit has averaged less than half the U.S. deficit over the last ten years.

The critics are correct in expressing concern about our lagging productive capacity. In the long run, standards of living for everyone are determined by our productivity. But our economic productivity is not supported

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by expanding government participation in the economy as the critics of our economy often seem to indicate. Quite the contrary. It is the government programs that these critics would like to see expanded which are supported by our economic productivity, productivity which is crucially dependent on a large and vibrant private sector.

Our discussion has not covered every criticism the collectivist critics of our economy have put forth. Their enthusiasm for finding fault greatly exceeds their dedication to careful analysis or consistency. For example we often hear on the one hand that the U.S. economy is not growing rapidly enough and on the other that we should eliminate economic growth entirely. Therefore, even if the will existed to respond to each, no consistent defense could be erected against all these criticisms. But it has been established that if the objective of these critics is to convince us that we should atone for our economic deficiencies by embracing their suggestions for greater involvement in our economy, they have failed to make their case. Most of the deficiencies we do have are either the result of, or would be aggravated by, this increased involvement. Also, when compared to other economies the U.S. economy is in much better shape than the critics would have us believe. There is nothing in their numbers or arguments to weaken the pride most of us justifiably have in our economic system. When judged on the basis of its ability to provide our diverse population with a measure of material comforts and personal freedoms experienced in few, if any, other countries, we have every reason to be proud of the U.S. economy and thankful to be part of it.

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LASER AND CHARGED PARTICLE BEAM WEAPONS

By Milton Copulos

Introduction

The idea of a lethal directed beam type of weapon has been a subject of science fiction for at least two generations. For more than five hundred years, warfare has been dominated by the need to produce weapons capable of launching projectiles of an almost countless variety for diminishing the ranks of an adversary. The projectiles have been designed to be lethal in themselves (e.g. bullets) or are designed to explode, producing the desired effect by virtue of high velocity fragments, flame, heat, or blast effects. Even nuclear weapons had to be delivered by sophisticated versions of well understood delivery systems but were capable of producing lethal radiological effect in addition to the more "traditional" blast and heat effects of chemical explosive. (1) Until recently, the dream of a high intensity directed beam weapon has exceeded the grasp of those who would develop it.

Advances in physics in the past fifteen years have made it possible for some of the fundamental problems inhibiting the development of directed beam technology to be addressed. The synergistic progress in computer technology, microelectronics, and optics has made it possible to produce laser beams. (2) The engineering community has been quick to exploit these developments where uses could be found. Perhaps their most publicized role has been for the purpose of guiding certain types of weapons to their target. An observer can "illuminate" a target either from the ground or in an aircraft with a laser team. Then a bomb or an artillery shell with an appropriate device (a "sensor") affixed to it follows the reflected laser beam to the target. Bombs and artillery shells employing laser sensors are a second-generation development of "smart bomb" technology that emerged from the Vietnam war. The first generation devices used in Vietnam were 3,000 pound bombs with a television guidance system rather than the laser-type (although an early version of a laser-guided bomb was employed in 1972). However, the problems of an adversary employing smoke or other countermeasures which would result in inadequate contrast

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for the TV guidance to work resulted in the employment of laser designators and sensors. (3) Now the employment of non-lethal laser devices has been expanded significantly. They are employed as range-finders on tanks and have early potential applications for communication purposes.

The most significant long-term potential for laser weapons lies in their strategic use as weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, however, their most appealing use is not as an instrument of mass destruction but as a highly capable defense system against the entire range of airborne threats from aircraft to ballistic missiles.

In this vein, a less well-known but potentially spectacular weaponry with practical applications similar to laser weapons are charged particle beam (CPB) weapons. Such devices would accelerate a subatomic particle so that it would have a very high energy level. The particles so produced would be beamed at or near the speed of light against a target quickly causing destruction of the target. Given their velocity and power, they would thus have the capacity to destroy incoming ICBMs hundreds of miles from their destination.

Laser vs. Charged Particle Beam Weapons

There are many unanswered problems in the physics and engineering of laser and charged particle beam weapon systems currently under intensive study in the defense establishments of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The primary advantage of the charged particle beam type of weapon is that its performance is not significantly degraded by passing through the atmosphere as is the case with a laser beam weapon. (4) Thus, a charged particle beam weapon could be employed at a few ground based sites in conjunction with either earth-borne or space-borne radar systems to identify and track incoming ballistic missile warheads. The charged particle beam weapon could be rapidly pointed at the incoming warhead, and an infinite number of "shots" could be fired with the speed of light at the target until it was destroyed. Targets could be destroyed at very long ranges, and thus only a small number of weapon sites would be necessary. The concept of charged particle beam weapons currently involves very large fixed installations, and therefore they may become vulnerable to sabotage or other forms of attack by an adversary, or the sensor systems (radar or other types) on which the CPB depends to find its targets could be attacked, rendering

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the system ineffective.

Laser technology is currently in an extremely rapid state of development, particularly the type of high energy lasers that could become candidates for space-borne applications. Funding activity for high energy lasers now accounts for two percent of R & D expenditure and may rise to five percent or more in the early 1980s. (5)

Now most of the expenditure is in the "research" rather than development phase. The latter phase is costly because it involves engineering prototypes rather than laboratory experiments. If some of the concepts now being researched in a laboratory environment prove to be effective, prototyping of the concepts could follow quickly.

Because laser weapons cannot be employed efficiently in the atmosphere, laser weapons would almost certainly have to be based in space, or at least in the upper atmosphere. This means that there would be no significant attenuation of the power of the laser beam, and the airborne or spaceborne target it seeks to destroy would be more easily identified and tracked. However, it does pose the problem of generating sufficient power in space to enable the weapon to perform effectively. In addition, such a system would have to be capable of being efficiently deployed in space and of being able to survive in such an environment in the event that effective anti-satellite type systems were developed. (6)

It is impossible to say whether laser or charged particle beam weapons will become a reality in the near future. Both have serious strengths and weaknesses that interfere with current operational requirements for a directed beam defense weapon. Based upon current defense requirements (i.e., the threat posed by ballistic missile warheads), charged particle beam weapons would probably be preferred by the defense establishments in both the United States and the Soviet Union because the added burden of space basing is not required. However, the development of the Space Shuttle by the United States may make it practical to place very large payloads in orbit cheaply, thus making space-deployed laser systems highly attractive. (7)

Soviet Activities in Laser and CPB Research

Little information is available in the unclassified domain about the extent of Soviet research and development activities in the laser and CPB field. For several years, theoretical work by Soviet scientists was published openly in international scientific literature, but the subject went "under-

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ground," presumably in the classified domain, when its military possibilities became more widely appreciated in the early 1970s.

Nevertheless, the scale of the Soviet effort appears to be vast. One published account describes the Soviet effort as approximately $1 billion annually in both the laser and CPB fields. (8)

Considerable recent interest has been stimulated by a difficult-to-explain "blinding" of a U.S. observation satellite by what was initially diagnosed as a laser weapon. Subsequent explanations by U.S. officials attributed the blinding to an intense natural gas pipeline fire in an isolated portion of the Soviet Union. (9) Another explanation may have been associated with an attempt to employ lasers for the ground-based physical characterization of satellites, a major objective of the U.S. laser program. (10) This would make it possible for the user to identify many of the technical details of a space-borne vehicle without the time-consuming processing of intercepted electro-magnetic radiation from the satellite or related technique now utilized to provide information about Soviet space vehicles. Because the wavelength of a laser beam can be measured with extreme precision, it is possible to exploit lasers for very precise measurement at great distances, even if they are not otherwise employed for military purposes.

Since the signing of the ABM Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, it is understood that the Soviet Union has a very energetic research and development program in ABM technology including "conventional" ABM involving ground based radars and interceptor missiles as well as more exotic laser and CPB weapons. One hypothesis which is consistent with the evidence available, but which cannot be proved, is that the Soviet Union is satisfied with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty under the existing strictures because they cannot develop an effective ABM technology of the conventional type. Conventional ABM technology depends very heavily on the ability to construct and deploy large-scale computer systems capable of controlling advanced radars and missiles throughout the Soviet Union. "Leap-frogging" to laser or CPB technology would permit the Soviet Union to avoid these areas of technology, in which they are weakest, and concentrate in areas where they have demonstrated considerable strength: optics and nuclear phenomenology. There is a school of thought within the U.S. intelligence community, currently a minority, who believe that the Soviets are far more advanced in laser and CPB technology than most specialists now believe. (11) This is a particularly difficult arena in which to make judgments because U.S. scientific personnel have little experience of

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their own with which they would compare. Unlike other types of technology where the United States has been the first developer, we are unable to know what theory may prove to be practical to produce an effective laser or CPB weapon. Thus, it is virtually impossible to ascertain with high confidence whether or not the Soviet Union is either far ahead or far behind our own efforts. Based upon those efforts which can be observed, it seems clear that the Soviet effort, in terms of resources invested, dwarfs our own; this however is not always a reliable guide to results. Conclusive evidence may only be known after a technological "Pearl Harbor."

Guidelines for Future American Research

While it is not feasible to predict where important scientific advances will take place, it seems reasonable to anticipate that lasers will have a major role in military forces by the end of this century, and perhaps well before that if important breakthroughs are achieved. Evolutionary development of current laser technology assures a place for lasers in target designation, communication, ranging, imaging. Plausible future developments of current laser concepts make the application of lasers to propulsion and power transmission and to the ABM role a serious possibility as well.

CPB weaponry is a much more difficult issue to assess. Basic problems in physics and engineering remain to be solved, and it is unlikely that any mere evolutionary development of existing technology will be sufficient to make CPB technology available for weapon purposes, particularly the ABM role.

What is required is, first, an expansion of resources and interest in the pertinent technologies. There is a danger that, because anti-ballistic missile defenses are currently proscribed, policy-makers will be persuaded that research in the field is not worth doing. In fact, over the long term, ABM technology may be the best answer to the problem of nuclear proliferation, and thus may well be brought back into prominence some years hence by Soviet-American agreement. Moreover, an active R & D program is the only means we have of maintaining an understanding of the areas where rapid technological advances are possible so that we may not be caught unaware if the Soviet Union suddenly makes unanticipated progress in the field.

Second, a diversified rather than a centralized research effort must be maintained so that an excessive amount of resources is not devoted to any single approach. There is an inherent danger in government funding that a

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particular approach may become bureaucratically fashionable to the disadvantage of promising alternative approaches.

Third, a "mobilization base" must be developed to work on the rapid deployment of a laser or CPB weapon system if it can be developed, or an alternative form of ABM defense if it cannot , as a hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in the field. The implications of a Soviet breakthrough, particularly in CPB weapons, are critical because the entire basis for mutual deterrence in the nuclear age could be upset with unmeasurable consequences for our security.

Finally, the tactical technological applications of laser research should be promoted vigorously. The tactical applications particularly of laser weapons are important to almost every area of modern warfare and may lead to breakthroughs affecting strategic warfare more rapidly than if the research focused on strategic warfare alone.

FOOTNOTES

(1) This capsule exposition is not to suggest that there have not been important differences between evolving military technologies. John Keegan's recent book, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), clearly demonstrates the traumatic impact advances in military technology have had from the long-bow of Agincourt to the carnage wrought by artillery and the machine gun in the Battle of the Somme. The role of the machine gun in changing the character of military history is also well developed in John Ellis' *The Social History of the Machine Gun*, (New York: Pantheon, 1975).

(2) "Laser" is an acronym for *light* amplified by *s*imulated *e*mission of *r*adiation.

(3) The Vietnam conflict was not the first modern conflict to employ "smart" weapons, however. Germany employed radio-guided bombs to sink an Italian cruiser captured by the British Navy in the Mediterranean in World War II. In the Vietnam conflict, very accurate delivery was possible, often 5-10 feet from the target with laser and TV-guided bombs. Even though some of the devices cost as much as $50,000, the ability to destroy a high-value target with a single bomb from a single aircraft was far less costly than multi-aircraft raids. A single bridge in North Vietnam was never successfully destroyed by conventional bombing tactics although more than two dozen aircraft were lost in the attempt. In 1972, the bridge was destroyed by a single 3,000 pound precision-guided bomb.

(4) One commentator, Richard L. Garwin, writing in *International Security*, (Fall 1976), argues against the cost-effectiveness of laser weapons for anti-aircraft, anti-cruise missile, and anti-ballistic missile employment when ground-based. Laser weapons require so much electrical power to penetrate the atmosphere with enough energy to destroy their target that, according to Garwin, more traditional types of systems would be more effective within the bounds of present laser technology. There is a belief that

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